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Preface 
Gure hitzak  
Esan berriz esan 
Ez daitezela ahaztu 
Ez daitezela gal 
Elur gainean 
Txori hanka arinek  
Utzitako arrasto sail 
Ederra bezalaxe. 
Bernardo Atxaga 
Bernardo Atxaga’s poem, popularized by Mikel Laboa’s song, illustrates a common 
intuition about languages and cultures: Our words need to be said, and said again, if 
they are not to be forever lost. Likewise for cultures. They must be repeated not to be 
forgotten, to endure. If they are not, they die. This is how languages, artifacts, customs, 
gestures, tales fade away from a group of humans, like “light birds’s footprints in the 
snow.” Not to mention cultural oppression, ethnocide or cultural assimilation where the 
possibility of re-producing culture is stopped, or directly erased. Continuing with the 
metaphor, when the snow melts or more snow falls, the shape of footprints transforms 
and changes. Human memory and transmission mechanisms are not perfect, and many 
things are lost. Others are changed. And new things are created. 
This poem captures one of the main worries of the community of Basques. Losing 
our language, Euskara, and with it, the most distinctive constituent of our culture. My 
mother tongue is Spanish, and the reason for that was not natural but cultural: my 
grandfather forbade my grandma to speak Basque to her sons and daughters. Cultural 
struggle is embedded in whatever we mean by “Basque culture.” 
vii 
This is too much responsibility for a single word like “culture.” Why do I say “too 
much responsibility”? The answer is quite simple: two opposite roles have been 
assigned to the word “culture.” First, it is supposed to refer to the main distinctive 
quality of the human species, the one that distinguishes us from the other species, and, 
at the same time, puts all humans on an equal footing. But, second, it is also taken to 
refer to what makes the different human groups different from each other. In a nutshell, 
culture ties up all humans together, and it separates us in groups; it is the glue that 
makes individuals a group, and it is the barrier that keeps individuals out of groups. 
The notion of culture itself is a mess, or humans make a mess by using (or abusing) 
such a notion; or, perhaps, both. Fortunately, it has become a very important object of 
inquiry for the social sciences in the last hundred years or so. I was born in a place 
where we need and want to solve a problem in which culture plays a critical role. Most 
likely, this has been the reason why I was attracted to the topic of this dissertation. I 
hope have shed some light on it. 
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1. Introduction
[P]hilosophy is the culture of the mind: 
this it is which plucks up vices by the 
roots; prepares the mind for the receiving 
of seeds; commits them to it, or, as I may 
say, sows them, in the hope that, when 
come to maturity, they may produce a 
plentiful harvest. 
Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes: 69 
Humans are cultural animals. However we understand the notion, culture is taken to be 
one of the two factors that make us human. The other is, of course, nature. Nature is 
what we share with other animals. Culture is our distinctive good. “[H]umans, as 
distinct from other animals have a culture—that is, a social heritage—transmitted not 
biologically through the germ cells but independently of genetic inheritance.” (Jacobs 
and Stern 1947: 2). 
Humans are also said to be political animals and linguistic animals. Politics, 
however, is understood as part of culture; and, language, as involving both natural and 
cultural elements. Culture and nature exhaust the sources of human heritage from 
generation to generation. Nature does it via adaptation, evolution and DNA. Culture 
does it in ways that we do not wholly understand yet. 
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Culture shapes us as species, and at the same time, shapes different groups and 
societies differently: “(…) the difference between groups is the difference in their 
cultures, their social heritage” (Davis and Dollard 1940: 4). Cultures arise, evolve and, 
perhaps, disappear. Or they resist the passage of time. Some are permeable and merge 
with others. Most likely, there are some cultures that are still isolated. Anthropology, 
sociology, and the social sciences in general study culture from that perspective. Yet, 
there are some questions that have not received appropriate answers, for example: What 
is culture? That is to say, what kind of stuff is culture made of? How is that stuff shared 
by human populations, groups, societies? By non-genetic transmission only? What do 
we mean by non-genetic transmission? And many others. In this work, I consider 
various answers to some of these questions, and I give my own. 
1.1. Culture as an object of study 
The social sciences started considering culture as an object of study in the second half 
of the nineteenth-century. It is in 1871 that the anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor 
gave what is considered to be the first “technical” definition of culture: 
Culture, or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities 
and habits acquired by man as a member of society. (Tylor 1871: 1) 
The principal features of culture in this definition are, first, that culture is a complex, an 
aggregate of variegated “things” such as psychological states of individuals (knowledge, 
beliefs, ideas), social or institutional rules (laws, morals, customs), other stuff which are 
not easy to classify (art, values, artifacts) and an open list of capabilities and habits. 
Second, the ways these last capabilities and habits are specifically those acquired by 
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persons by them as members of a society. And third, we can understand that the same 
goes for the initial items in the list. It is not any knowledge or belief, or custom or habit, 
that is cultural, but only those acquired by the person qua member of society. It is 
difficult to know what that exactly means, especially in the case of acquiring art, but I 
take it that it is pointing towards the acquisition of culture by non-genetic means within 
a “society”.  
Commenting on Tylor’s multifarious list, Jesse Prinz makes the following remark: 
Subsequent authors have worried that Tylor’s definition packs in too much, lumping 
together psychological items (e.g., belief) with external items (e.g., art). This would be 
especially problematic for those who hope that culture could be characterized as a 
natural kind, and thus as a proper subject for scientific inquiry. Other definitions often 
try to choose between the external and internal options in Tylor’s definition. (Prinz 
2011: 2) 
In order to get an idea of the consequences of this problem, one just needs to have a 
look to the 165 definitions of culture from the social sciences collected by Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn (1952) since Tylor’s 1871 definition. They classified those definitions into 
the categories of descriptive, historical, normative, psychological, structural and 
genetic.1 
After the work of collecting and analyzing definitions of culture, Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn realized that,  
[O]ne thing is clear to us from our survey: it is time for a stock-taking of notes, for 
conscious awareness of the range of variation. Otherwise the notion that is conveyed 
to the wider company of educated men will be so loose, so diffuse as to promote 
confusion rather than clarity. [footnote 5: One sometimes feels that A. Lawrence 
Lowell’s remarks about the humanistic concept of culture is almost equally applicable 
to the anthropological: “... I have been entrusted with the difficult task of speaking 
                                                
1 See Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952. Notice that all these categories are grounded in the the first 
descriptive one, which they characterize as enumerative, and of which Tylor’s is the model. 
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about culture. But there is nothing in the world more elusive. One cannot analyze it, 
for its components are infinite. One cannot describe it, for it is a Protean in shape. An 
attempt to encompass its meaning in words is like trying to seize the air in the hand, 
when one finds that it is everywhere except within one’s grasp.” (1934, 115)]” 
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952: 4) 
The point was to analyze the definitions and see if some consensus was possible to shed 
some light and open the way to develop a science of culture. This was very important 
because the “culture concept of the anthropologists and sociologists [was] coming to be 
regarded as the foundation stone of the social sciences” (Chase 1948: 59). But 
consensus was not reached. 
Basically, the main problem in the 50’s, was that the social sciences were divided 
between the ones that argued, on the one hand, that culture was “an abstraction from 
concrete human behavior, but … not itself behavior” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952: 
155)— or “culture itself is intangible and cannot be directly apprehended even by the 
individuals who participate in it” (Linton 1936: 288-89), it is “intangible” (Herskovits 
1945: 150), or “the anthropologist cannot observe culture directly” (Beals and Hoijer 
1953:210)—and, on the other hand, the ones that consider that the way culture was 
talked about was, to say the least, vague, and puts in question its very existence: “If it 
[culture] can be said to exist at all. ...” (Linton 1936: 363), “[it] denotes, not any 
concrete reality, but an abstraction, and as it is commonly used a vague abstraction.” 
(Radcliffe-Brown 1940: 2). Spiro adds that according to the predominant “position of 
contemporary anthropology ... culture has no ontological reality....” (1951: 24).2 
Moreover, in 2005, Baldwin et al. collected a further 300 definitions (to those of 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952)), albeit with a different perspective: 
                                                
2 For the debate in the 50s on the scientific status of culture see White 1959. 
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[C]ulture shifted [in the second half of the twentieth-century] from being an object of 
study to becoming, under these various paradigms and their definitions, a flexible tool 
for study in the service of different analytical projects. Whereas culture was once seen 
as static and unchanging, a set of patterns or forms shared among members of a group, 
it became a tool used to study the convergence of power, inequality, and history. 
(Baldwin et al. 2005: xii) 
Baldwin et al. did not collect definitions of culture with the goal of finding a 
unifying definition that would allow a scientific project, and provide anthropology with 
“scientific” status. They just described the current academic and philosophical 
landscape of the term “culture” since the “Kroeber-and-Kluckhohnesque version of 
culture [is] inadequate for describing the current academic and philosophical landscape 
of the word” (Baldwin et al. 2005: 16).3 
Thus, we can say, that the project to reach a consensus on the definition of culture 
has failed. Kroeber and Kluckhohn made a key observation, which the current 
naturalistic approaches take as a departure point: the idea that “in anthropology at 
present we have plenty of definitions but too little theory” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
1952: 181). 
The mismatch, represented by both collections of definitions, and the problem 
pointed out by Jesse Prinz, of “packing too much” into the definition of culture, are the 
main challenges in the social sciences. In a nutshell, this is the main problem: if we 
want to bring cultural items such as artifacts and artworks together with mental or 
abstract entities like beliefs and rules, then how are they to be integrated into a 
comprehensive notion of culture in a scientific way?  
This lack of consensus in the 1950s could be attributed to the lack of theoretical 
resources, which was Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s 1952 diagnosis. Yet, it was at that time 
                                                
3 See Baldwin 2005 and Clifford & Marcus 1986 for criticisms of attempts to naturalize culture. 
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that the discoveries that allowed the birth and development of naturalistic explanations 
of culture, started to be available. 
Until the cognitive revolution of the second half of the twentieth century, mental 
phenomena had no counterpart in the natural sciences. One could, of course, assert 
that mental phenomena occurred in the brain and postulate that they were wholly 
material, but there was no understanding whatsoever of how matter in general and 
brain tissues in particular might realize mental processes. The choice was then 
between pursuing a non-naturalistic psychology, and, as did behaviorists, pursuing a 
naturalistic psychology understood as a science not of the mind but of behavior. With 
the development of the mathematical theory of automata on the one hand, and of the 
neurosciences on the other, it is now possible to understand how matter in general and 
brain tissues in particular can process information. (Sperber 2011: 67) 
Apart from the contributions of the “cognitive revolution” (Chomsky 1959), the 
“mathematical theory of automata” (Turing 1936), and communication (Shannon 1948), 
mentioned by Sperber, the second half of the nineteenth-century and first half of the 
twentieth-century brought the “theory of evolution” (Darwin 1968 [1859]), the 
“discovery of genes” (Mendel 1996 [1866]) and the “evolutionary synthesis” 
(developed between 1920 and 1940 by R. A. Fisher, J. B. S. Haldane, and Sewell 
Wright).4 
Each of those developments in other areas has provided the theoretical machinery 
for explaining culture in more naturalistic ways (in causal terms without appealing to 
other realms) and “allowed these informal intuitions [about culture] to be tested far 
more precisely than is possible with informal, verbal arguments and thought 
experiments” (Mesoudi 2011: 49). Or as Sperber said in Explaining Culture. A 
Naturalistic Approach, 
                                                
4 See Mayr 2000 for the development of the modern theory of evolution, and Mesoudi 2011: 55-
83 for the applications of biological evolutionary models to culture. 
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A spectre haunts the social sciences, the spectre of a natural science of the social. 
Some wait for the day that the spectre will make itself known, and will at last make 
the social sciences truly scientific. Others denounce the threat of scientism and 
reductionism. Some say they speak for the spectre. Others say it is just a hoax. Here is 
what I think: in lieu of a spectre, there is just a child in limbo. A naturalistic 
programme in the social sciences is conceivable, but it has yet to be developed. In this 
book, I present a fragment of such a programme: a naturalistic approach to culture. 
(Sperber 1996: vi) 
Current naturalistic approaches first appeared in the 1970s and 80s applying those 
developments in other disciplines to the study of culture, and providing culture with 
material grounds. They focused on explaining “that complex whole” that Tylor pointed 
to more than a century ago. But if culture is just a set of transmitted items, then what are 
those things that we typically call cultural items? 
This is the target question of the present dissertation. I contend that naturalistic 
approaches are missing something in their explanations, and what they are missing is to 
be found using a notion from a theory of information and language born in the 80s: the 
notion of constraints from Situation Theory (Barwise and Perry 1999 [1983]). The 
present dissertation it is not a work of anthropology or sociology. It is an attempt to 
provide a basis that naturalistic approaches require: the basis for an adequate account of 
what constitutes the subject matter of culture. 
1.2. Outline 
In Chapter 2, I present some basic notions of Situation Theory—especially, the notions 
of situation, constraint and attunement—which, as I argue, are key to rethinking the 
subject matter of culture. In Chapter 3, I present and criticize the three main naturalistic 
theories of culture: the epidemiology of representations, memetics and the standard 
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evolutionary approaches. I conclude that, despite their differences, they are all versions 
of what I call the “Itemic View of Culture.” Then, in chapter 4, I develop my own 
approach, which I call a “Constraint-Based Approach,” which results from an 
application of the notions of constraint and attunement to the analysis of culture. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the comparison of these two views, concluding that the view I 
defend is a necessary complement to the Itemic View. Finally, in Chapter 6, I draw my 
main conclusions and indicate directions for future research.  
  10 
2. Constraints and Attunement 
Critical Notions for an Enquiry into Culture 
What underlies the phenomenon of infor-
mation is the fact that reality is lawlike; 
that what is going on in one part of reality 
is related to what is going on in some 
other part of reality, by laws, nomic 
regularities, or as we shall say, 
constraints. 
Israel and Perry 1990: 3 
2.1. Introduction 
If there is a notion that is crucial for the present explanation of culture, it is the notion of 
“constraint.” As I have already said, I think that constraints are missing in the main 
naturalistic accounts, or, at best, their presence is left implicit. Either way, this causes a 
significant lacuna in their respective explanations, which I will discuss in Chapter 5. 
There I attempt to argue for the use of the notion of constraints in a naturalistic 
approach to culture. But first, I need to explain what constraints are. 
My notion of “constraints” comes from Situation Theory, a “qualitative” theory of 
information that allows the classification of real situations in a clear way by modeling 
them. This theory was developed by Jon Barwise and John Perry starting in the 80’s, 
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first outlined in the paper “Situations and attitudes” (1981) and further elaborated in 
their book Situations and Attitudes (1999 [1983]). 
2.2. Situations 
The central notion in Situation Theory is the notion of a “situation”. It corresponds, 
roughly, to our intuitive notion of a situation: me, here right now typing these words; 
the football match in Anoeta yesterday; our family dinner in Gasteiz last Christmas; the 
first two months of Trump’s presidency in the USA… Small or big, remote or in my 
closest vicinity, situations are parts of the world we live in, they are “basic and 
ubiquitous. We are always in some situation or other” (Barwise and Perry 1981: 668). 
Situations are parts of the world we live in. We cause them to come about (e.g. I’m 
typing these words now); we perceive them (Eros saw the football match in Anoeta 
yesterday); we think about them (I think that our family dinner in Gasteiz last Christmas 
was fun) or talk about them (as I’m doing now). We do all this because our cognitive 
activity categorizes situations in terms of “objects having attributes and standing in 
relations to one another at locations—connected regions of space-time” (Barwise and 
Perry 1981: 668).  
2.2.1. States of affairs 
There are many things going on in situations. Whatever the size of situations, there are 
an indeterminate number of things going on in them. In the situation I characterize as 
“me, here right now typing these words,” all the following is going on:  
- Josu is sitting on a particular chair 
- Josu is in front of a particular computer 
  12 
- Josu is typing on the computer’s keyboard 
- Josu is breathing 
- The computer is on 
- The computer is working… 
Those states and events that occur in situations are what Situation Theory calls states of 
affairs. 
Since there are an indeterminate number of states of affairs going on in a situation, 
we, as living organisms products of evolution, pick up the ones relevant to us and 
identify situations according to those relevant states of affairs. If I am crossing a street, I 
see a car that is coming towards me while crossing and the driver is not slowing down, I 
would not identify the situation as “the driver of the car is breathing,” “the driver is 
sitting in the car,” “the car is red,” “the car wheels are spinning,” and so on. I most 
probably will identify the situation as “a car coming towards me”. It is relative to what 
we identify is going in situations that we behave in one way or another. Thus, if I 
identify the situation as “a car coming towards me” my way of behaving would be to 
run, which may not occur if the situation is identified as “the driver breathing” or “the 
car being red,” although those states of affairs are taking place in the situation.  
 Objects, relations and locations 
Objects, relations and space-time locations are the building blocks of states of affairs. 
Situation Theory pulls them out from real situations and takes them as “primitives” for 
representing the “internal structure” (Barwise and Perry 1999 [1983]: 53) and the 
relations between situations. 
In short, objects are real individual things like me, a particular chair, or a croquette. 
In Situation Theory, relations are also part of the furniture of the world, e.g. sitting on, 
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scoring, eating. Relations have arguments. Relations with only one argument are called 
properties.5 
Locations are spatio-temporal chunks of space and time, that is, regions of space 
and moments or time intervals, such as here, now, Anoeta yesterday (5 to 7pm), my 
aunt’s home the night of December 25th, or the US during the last two months. 
Objects, relations and locations are items that we find and recognize across 
different situations. Think about the following situation, Josu (me) sitting on a chair at 
ILCLI now (March 8th of 2017, at 11:00 am). The objects (Josu and the chair) and the 
relation (SITTING-ON) were also part of other situations, for example, the situation in 
which I was sitting on the same chair yesterday at ILCLI. In short, objects, relations and 
locations are invariants or “uniformities,” using situation-theoretic terminology. 
What goes on in situations is what situation theory calls “states of affairs” or 
“infons.” In the situation I’m in right now, we can consider whether it is a fact that I’m 
sitting on a chair. That is a state of affairs that can be represented as follows: 
σ1: <<SITTING-ON, Josu, chair, at ILCLI room C8 - March 8th-11am; 1>> 
The state of affairs σ1 is constituted by a relation (SITTING-ON), its arguments (Josu 
and a particular chair) and a spatio-temporal location (ILCLI room C8, right now). The 
number 1 after the semicolon is the polarity item of the state of affairs, which represents 
that the arguments stand in that relation at that spatio-temporal location. The state of 
affairs with the same relation, arguments and spatio-temporal location but with a 0 as 
the polarity item is called the dual of σ1, which I represent as σ ̄1: 
                                                
5 See Barwise and Perry (1999 [1983] 7-9, 50-51) for a detailed account concerning the 
terminology. See also Devlin (1991) for the term “infon.” 
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σ ̄1: <<SITTING-ON-A-CHAIR, Josu, ILCLI room C8, March 8th-11am; 0>> 
and means that the arguments do not stand in that relation at that spatio-temporal 
location. 
Call s my present situation here. As I said, I’m sitting in a chair right know. σ1 is a 
fact in s, or using situation-theoretic notation:  
s ⊨σ1 
which is read as, “the situation s supports σ,” “s makes it the case that σ” or “s makes σ 
factual.” 
Of course, if s supports σ1, then it doesn’t support its dual, σ ̄1. It cannot be the case 
that s supports the state of affairs σ1 (me sitting on a chair here right now) and σ ̄1 (me 
not sitting in that very same chair, here right now). In general, if a situation supports a 
state of affairs σ, then, that situation does not support its dual, σ ̄. Or, in other words, 
situations are coherent.  
On the other hand, it is not the case that, for any state of affairs σ and any situation 
s, the situation either supports σ or supports its dual σ ̄. The situation may remain 
“silent” about the issue of whether σ or its dual σ ̄ is a fact, because situations are 
partial. We may consider that there is a total situation called “the world” that 
determines for all state of affairs σ, whether σ or its dual σ ̄ is the case, but situations, 
being partial portions of the world do not resolve all issues.  
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Also, situations support more state affairs than just one. That is, typically, in any 
situation there are many things going on. In my present situation s there is an 
indeterminate number of states of affairs which are supported by it: 
σ2: <<TYPING, Josu, words, ILCLI room C8 - March 8th-11am; 1>> 
σ3: <<IN-FRONT-OF, Josu, computer, ILCLI room C8 - March 8th-11am; 1>> 
σ4: <<LEFT-OF, Josu, Kepa, ILCLI room C8 - March 8th-11am; 1>> 
σ5: <<SLEEPING, Josu, ILCLI room C8 - March 8th-11am; 0>> 
and so on. 
The states of affairs supported by a situation can be taken to represent information 
that the situation contains. Thus, we can say that my present situation s contains the 
information represented in σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4 and σ5. But just to be clear s does not “say” 
anything about the following state of affairs 
σ6: <<SLEEPING, Yolanda, at home - March 8th-11am; 1>> 
or about its dual, σ ̄6. 
Thus, s does not contain the information that Yolanda is sleeping in her home or 
that she is not. Following Situation Theory, s is “silent” about σ6 or σ ̄6 (Barwise and 
Perry 1999 [1983]: 98) because these states of affairs “belong” to a different situation 
s’, which might support σ6 (or σ ̄6) or not.  
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2.2.2. Types of situations 
Once again, in my present situation s, σ1 is a fact. That is, 
s ⊨<<SITTING-ON, Josu, chair, at ILCLI room C8 - March 8th-11am; 1>> 
s is a real situation that supports, among others, a state of affairs in which some objects 
stand in a relation at a particular location. Objects, relations and locations are items that 
we find and recognize across different situations. The objects (Josu and the chair) and 
the relation (SITTING-ON) are also part of other situations, for example, the situation 
in which I was sitting on the same chair yesterday at ILCLI.  
Objects, relations and locations are invariants or “uniformities,” using situation 
theoretic terminology. Situation Theory pulls out those uniformities from real situations 
and uses them as “primitives” for representing the “internal structure” and relations 
between situations (Barwise and Perry 1999 [1983]: 53). This allows us to identify that 
the real situation s, for instance, is a situation of various sorts or types. It belongs to the 
type of situations in which Josu is sitting on a chair in the ILCLI room C8, no matter 
when; or to the type of situations in which Josu is sitting on a chair somewhere, 
sometime; or the situations in which Josu is sitting; or situations in which someone is 
sitting… The point should be rather obvious by now. Abstracting from the constituents 
of a state of affairs, we can build all sorts of types of situations. Thus, for instance, we 
can abstract upon the spatio-temporal location and consider the type of situation S in 
which I am sitting on a chair as the class of situations that support states of affairs with 
the relation SITTING-ON, me, a chair, and the polarity item 1, namely, 
S={s: ⊨<<SITTING-ON, Josu, chair, l; 1>>} 
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and all sorts of types of situations involving me, such as the types of situations in which 
I am eating lunch or the types of situations in which I am typing on my computer 
keyboard: 
S’={s: ⊨<<EATING-LUNCH, Josu, l; 1>>} 
S’’={s: ⊨<<TYPING, Josu, Josu’s computer, l; 1>>} 
My present situation s is of types S and S’’, but it’s not of type S’. We can say that 
being aware of the situation I’m living in is to classify it in terms of the types of 
situation it belongs (or doesn’t belong) to. In other words, identifying the state of affairs 
supported by a situation (the information contained in the situation) amounts to 
classifying the situation as belonging to certain types. 
Types of situation are central to distinguish the information contained in a situation 
and the information carried by it.  
2.2.3. Containing versus carrying information  
As we have seen, states of affairs supported by a situation can be taken to represent 
information the situation contains, but besides situations containing information, they 
carry information about other situations more or less spatio-temporally remote. To 
illustrate the difference between containing and carrying information in a situation, 
imagine the following situation. You are walking in Gladys Enea Park this morning and 
you find a stump. The following is information contained in the situation, i.e. a state of 
affairs supported by the situation: 
σ7: <<NUMBER-OF-RINGS, stump, seven, Gladys Enea Park, March 15-10am; 
1>> 
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This is a fact, a state of affairs supported by the situation. It is also information 
contained in s that you get. But you learn in school that tree rings revealed in a cross 
section cut of a tree (the case of a stump) indicate the age of the tree in question. So, by 
getting the information of σ6 contained in s you learn that the tree was seven years old 
when it was cut. Nevertheless, this is information about a different situation; a situation 
that contains the same tree but at a different time (the time when it was cut).  
The situation with the tree stump in Gladys Enea Park carries information about 
the age of the tree at the time it was cut, the sort of tool that was (or wasn’t) used to cut 
it, the direction to the north pole relative to the tree now, and so on; situations of many 
sorts all different from the situation I’m in. In the situation I’m in there is a tree-stump 
with n rings, and this carries the information that that tree had n years when it was cut. 
The cut is flat and clean, it was not cut with an axe. The stump has moss on this side, 
this side points to the north. 
This sort of information is not exclusive to this particular situation with this 
particular stump, but the result of certain law-like regularities between types of 
situations: situations containing (some kind of tree) with a number of rings and 
situations involving their age, the way they were cut down, or the relation between moss 
and the direction north (in the northern hemisphere). In Situation Theory, these law-like 
regularities are called constraints. 
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2.3. Constraints 
Constraints are relations between types of situations. For example, the constraint that S 
involves S’ (S => S’) states that if there is a situation of type S, then there is a situation 
of type S’. 
In our last example, the constraint links the type of situation with trees with n rings 
with the type of situation with trees with n years. Constraints hold (or don’t) “out there” 
in the world and account for the flow of information occurring between real situations:  
These constraints are what provide reality with a structure that supports the flow of 
information in general and linguistic communication in particular. (Barwise & Perry 
1999 [1893]: 97) 
Some constraints are ubiquitous or unconditional, holding at every spatio-temporal 
location or at the universal location, if we accept such a thing, together with a total 
situation (the world). But other constraints, perhaps most, are conditional, “holding only 
under certain special circumstances or conditions” (Barwise and Perry 1999 [1983]: 94). 
Some of them, like our ring-years example, hold in natural environments. Barwise and 
Perry call these sorts of constraints “nomic structural constraints”: “The usual models 
for natural laws or nomic constraints are the very general laws of science, the laws we 
study in physics and chemistry” (Barwise and Perry (1999 [1983]: 98). Some other 
constraints are conventional. They arise out of situation and types of situations 
involving human beings. Obviously, conventional conditional constraints are especially 
relevant for our purposes. The kind of constraints involved in culture are precisely 
these. Let us see what conventional constraints are and their main similarities and 
differences with natural ones.  
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2.3.1. Natural constraints 
According to Situation Theory, we can divide constraints roughly into two main kinds: 
natural and conventional. 
Natural constraints are “inviolable patterns in nature… patterns that are usually 
called natural laws” (Barwise and Perry 1999 [1983]: 98). For example, if I am holding 
a pen and I drop it, then it will fall. It can be formulated like this:  
C: if any x drops the pen s/he is holding, then the pen will fall. 
One may be tempted to think that since these constraints are inviolable they always 
hold. Nonetheless, natural constraints are environment dependent, i.e. they are local. C 
is a natural constraint that holds in a certain environmental setting l (the planet Earth). 
In the International Space Station, however, C does not hold. This is because, apart 
from being natural, C is also conditional. If I recognize the situation s as a type of 
situation S in which someone is dropping a pen, thanks to C I’ll anticipate an immediate 
situation s’ of type S’ in which that pen falls.6 However, if I am in the International 
Space Station and one of my companions drops the pen she is holding, C will provide 
me wrong information about the next situation, since in the International Space Station 
C does not hold. Instead C’ holds in l’ (the International Space Station) 
C’: If any x drops the pen s/he is holding, then the pen will float. 
Natural constraints are thus the constraints that scientists look for, are the ones that 
“[constrain] the way things can fall out” (Barwise and Perry 1999 [1983]: 18). 
                                                
6 See McIntyre et al. (2001) for an experiment involving catching a baseball in the space. 
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In a few words, the situation s carries information about the situation s’ relative to 
the constraint C: S ⇒ S’. And when an organism is attuned to this constraint, it exploits 
the constraint to extract information about s’ from s.  
This notion of attunement has clear parallelisms with notions such as know-how 
and implicit knowledge (and cognition). However, going further than an intuitive 
elucidation of these concepts is beyond the scope of the present work.7 My concern is 
with humans and their culture, and as it will become clear, a distinction between explicit 
(representational) knowledge and attunement will prove useful. I contend that humans 
can know a constraint and not be attuned to it; and, conversely, can be attuned to it 
without knowing it. I will clarify this shortly. It will be helpful, however, to say a bit 
more about conventional constraints. 
2.3.2. Conventional constraints  
Conventional constraints are the most important ones for our topic, because as we shall 
see in Chapter 4, what I call “cultural constraints” are conventional constraints with 
some special features. 
Conventional constraints are the ones that “arise out of explicit or, more often, 
implicit conventions that hold within a community of living beings” (Barwise and Perry 
1999 [1983]: 98). Examples of conventional constraints are the giving of two kisses to a 
woman when greeting her or the ring of a bell to let students know that the class has 
finished.  
These constraints arise in a community of living beings and hold if they are 
exploited in their community environment. That is to say, conventional constraints are 
                                                
7 For Barwise’s reply to Fodor’s critique of attunement as blatantly behavioristic (and, therefore, 
hopeless) or implicitly intentionalistic (and therefore useless), see Barwise 1989:141-142.  
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local. For example, the way of greeting varies in different places and my way of 
greeting women by giving them two kisses is only held by a particular community. I 
follow the constraint C1: if I give a woman two kisses, then I am greeting this woman, 
but in other groups the constraint might not hold. Instead, another constraint C2 might 
hold: if I give two kisses to a woman, then I am offending that woman and her family.  
Another important feature of conventional constraints is that they are violable. 
These constraints relate two situations in a way such that they “only [constrain] the way 
things fall out when the convention is not violated” (Barwise and Perry 1999 [1983]: 
18). For example, conventional constraints “governing” greetings can be violated. There 
is a constraint operating in my community environment that relates a person greeting 
some other person, and that other person returning the greeting. However, you may 
greet me, but I can violate the constraint by, for whatever reason, not greeting you back. 
In the same way, the ring of a bell in a school carries the information that the class is 
finished (in many schools), but it can be the case that a class has been punished with 
one more hour of Mathematics, violating then the constraint.  
The existence of conventional constraints depends on people exploiting the 
constraint. Conventional constraints are not imposed upon us by nature but established 
by us, both individually and socially, and are maintained as long as they continue being 
exploited. A clear example of this is the case of language.  
As we know, the main goal of Situation Semantics is to find out what the 
constraints in language are, and these constraints are conventional:  
Our knowledge of language consists primarily of implicit knowledge about implicit 
conventional constraints. That is, to know English (…) is all knowledge about various 
conventional constraints that hold within our linguistic community. And it is this 
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implicit knowledge that those of us who study language attempt to make explicit. 
(Barwise and Perry 1999 [1983]: 98-99) 
I think that this is right about language. On the one hand, by knowing a language we 
usually mean having an “implicit knowledge about implicit conventional constraints,” in 
my terminology that is to be simply attuned to conventional constraints. On the other 
hand, the conventional constraints of a language holding within a linguistic community 
involves a set of individuals having this implicit knowledge about those conventional 
constraints. But this is not the case, I think, for all conventional constraints.8 
 Conventional constraints can be individual 
As I take the concept of convention and, hence, the notion of conventional constraints, it 
is possible for an individual to create a conventional constraint without the involvement 
of any group or set of other individuals. Take the example of my method of organizing 
my notes for the present work. The colors of post-it-marker stand for various crucial 
notions: blue is for “constraint,” green for “culture,” yellow for “epidemiology of 
representations” and red for “meme.” The post-its help me find those notions across the 
papers on my desk. As I use this method systematically, I establish four constraints, four 
systematic relations between types of situations, or regularities,9 where a tab of the color 
                                                
8 Of course, this is oversimplified. I talk a bit more about our implicit knowledge of (or, as I 
prefer to say, attunement to) linguistic constraints below, but note that I am talking here about 
the implicit knowledge of a particular natural language, and not about the process of 
acquisition of the language, which, admittedly, can be driven biologically through a natural 
language acquisition device (Chomsky 1965). As I see it, we are naturally endowed to acquire 
any language, and that has to do with natural constraints. But then, as a product of the 
acquisition of one particular language and not another, we become attuned to one particular set 
of conventional constraints and not another. See more on language as conventional constraints 
in Chapters 4 and 5.  
9 It is generally agreed that conventions are as Lewis (1975: 4) said “regularities in action, or in 
action and belief”.  
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x on a page involves that the concept y appears in that page. I think these constraints 
deserve to be considered conventional even if they are entirely personal.  
I am not giving a general account of what “conventions” are. But I think it is 
reasonable to label purely individual constraints, such as my post-it constraints, as 
conventional, insofar they share the features of conventional constraints: they are 
violable (I can put in a yellow color post-it a note about “culture”), they depend on my 
(implicit) knowledge, and they are established by non-genetic means, if they are 
established at all. 
Thus, as I take it, a conventional constraint does not require a community per se. 
We don’t need to think about conventional constraints as a coordination problem 
between individuals (Lewis 2002 [1969]), as regularities in action or in action and 
belief, nor as products of an implicit or explicit “common interest” (Lewis 1975: 4), 
requiring always more than one individual.10  
If we accept that a convention can be purely individual, then, conventional 
constraints need not be cultural, while all cultural constraints are necessarily 
conventional. This rests on the fact that a conventional constraint can arise from the 
behavior of just one individual, like my way of organizing papers by post-its with 
different colors. 
2.3.3. Natural versus conventional constraints  
I have sketched that constraints can be divided roughly into two main kinds: natural and 
conventional. Typically, both are conditional, i.e. non-necessary constraints.11 They 
                                                
10 Unless we take the past, present and future stages of a person as different individuals which 
coordinate. 
11 The only examples of necessary constraints they consider are necessary or analytic truths like 
the truths in mathematics (Barwise and Perry 1999 [1983]: 97).  
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hold in certain environments and not in others. In the same way that constraint C (if any 
x drops the pen she is holding, then the pen will fall) only holds in certain environments, 
conventional constraints are also local. Thus, they arise in a community of living beings 
and hold if they are exploited in this community’s environment.  
Nonetheless, there are important differences between the two. On the one hand, 
natural constraints are natural laws, the kind of constraints natural scientists look for. 
Conventional constraints, on the other hand, connect two situations in virtue of a 
systematic but violable relation established by people. For example, the ring of a bell in 
a school carries the information that the class is finished (in many schools), but it could 
have carried the information that “whoever lies down on the floor will get good marks 
in all their subjects.”12 
The property of (in)violability is essential to distinguish both kinds of constraints. 
While conventional constraints are violable, natural constraints are not. On earth, 
objects cannot be suspended in air. This is an “inviolable pattern,” no matter if we 
(implicitly or explicitly) know that it is the case. However, the conventional constraints 
“governing” greetings can be violated. For whatever reason, I may not greet you back 
when you greet me.  
There is another important property that distinguishes these two kinds of 
constraints, which follows from the general picture provided by Barwise and Perry. This 
difference has to do with the (implicit) knowledge organisms have about constraints, 
that is, with the organism’s attunement. The existence of natural constraints does not 
depend on any organisms having any (implicit) knowledge of them, that is, of being 
attuned to them. The world would go on working according to the constraints even if no 
                                                
12 This was one of my dreams when I was at school. 
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living organism acted according to the constraints; though, most likely, the organisms 
would perish. Someone could argue that some natural constraints involve the natural 
workings of organisms: like animals (implicitly) knowing that their being in certain 
place put them in great danger of being hunted. But they are still non-violable 
genetically transmitted (attunements to) constraints.13 The existence of conventional 
constraints, however, depends on people exploiting the constraint.  
To sum up, on my take of the situation-theoretic notion of constraints, natural and 
conventional constraints differ in at least three aspects. (See Table I) On the one hand, 
natural constraints are not violable; the attunement of a living organism to a natural 
constraint is mandated by the organism’s genes, and thus, is necessarily shared by all 
typical individuals of the same species and they are attunement-independent. On the 
other hand, an individual can violate a conventional constraint; its attunement to a 
conventional constraint is not genetically mandated and if it happens it is established by 
other means (so, sharing the attunement with its kind is not mandatory) and their 
existence depends essentially on the attunement of some individual to them.  
Natural constraints Conventional constraints 
Inviolable Violable 
Attunement established by genetic 
means 
Attunement established by non-genetic 
means 
Attunement independent Attunement dependent 
Table I. Natural vs. conventional constraints 
In this work, for obvious reasons, I focus on conventional constraints. 
                                                
13 We exploit/rely on those natural constraints that “govern” the behavior of animals, in order to 
domesticate and hunt them. 
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2.4. Modes of attunement 
As far as I can tell, in Situation Theory, there is no detailed elaboration on the various 
ways an organism can be attuned to a constraint, but I think it is reasonable to 
distinguish various modes of being attuned.  
As we have seen, attunement is a fundamental relation between living organisms 
and constraints, a relation fundamental to the explanation of how the organisms cope 
with the world. We have contrasted attunement with knowledge. One of the main 
differences can be put like this: while attunement is a “direct” relation between 
organisms and constraints, knowledge is an indirect relation always mediated by the 
(explicit) representations of constraints.  
Focusing on attunement, I distinguish three different modes of attunement 
according to the organism’s level of awareness, or lack thereof, about its attunement to 
the constraint. This applies both to natural and conventional constraints, though it has a 
special implication for the case of conventional and cultural constraints. For the latter, it 
will be worth looking at the different ways in which attunement to a constraint can be 
shared by a set of people. I’ll discuss the last point—sharing attunement—in Chapter 4.  
2.4.1. Simple attunement 
Simple attunement (or s-attunement, for short) corresponds to the most basic mode of 
attunement described by Barwise and Perry. Living organisms are attuned to natural 
constraints without needing any explicit representation of it. It is in their biological 
architecture, built upon genetic transmission, to be attuned to the constraint. They need 
not be aware of it. And often they are not. Living organisms with a mass, not living in 
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oceans or rivers, are attuned to gravity on earth. Most of them are not aware of it most 
of the time.  
Humans, of course, have the capacity of becoming aware of their attunement to 
some constraints, but they do not need to be aware of them to be attuned. As we have 
already said, when things work reasonable well, we are not aware of the constraints nor 
of our attunement to them. If we assume, as Situation Theory does, that a language is a 
set of conventional constraints, the members of a particular language community are 
attuned to those constraints. In a monolingual community, native speakers will not 
usually be aware of the language they speak and they are not normally aware about their 
attunement to their own language. 
I will reserve the term s-attunement for this kind of attunement of an organism to a 
constraint: the case in which an organism is attuned to a constraint, without being aware 
of that fact. 
2.4.2. Aware attunement 
When things go well, we often are not aware of our attunement to constraints. For 
example, if you “grow up in a particular community, one in which a certain language is 
spoken, with a certain dialect, and with certain local usages and customs” (Barwise and 
Perry 1999 [1983]: 99) in your youth, you may not be aware that you speak a certain 
local variety of a certain dialect of a certain language. Then, one day, a guy from a 
neighboring region laughs at you because of your “accent;” and you realize that there 
are different dialects and local usages. You don’t know how your dialect exactly is, but 
you become aware that you are attuned to a certain dialect. I’ll call this aware-
attunement or aw-attunement, which can be defined thus:  
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The agent x is aw-attuned to constraint C if and only if x is aware that she is s-
attuned to C. 
You speak a certain dialect of a certain language, and now you are aware that you 
speak it. However, if asked the difference between your dialect and the neighboring 
region dialect, you cannot tell much more than that they are different, and that you 
speak one and your neighbors speak the other. 
2.4.3. Fully conscious attunement 
With some attention and study of your own linguistic practices and the contrast with 
other dialects you could get an explicit representation of your distinctive constraints. 
You can notice that if you want to denote butterflies you use “tximeleta.” That’s the 
constraint to which you are attuned. Your neighbors use different words. The ones in 
the West use “mitxeleta”; the ones in the North “Pinpilinpauxa”. And you make explicit 
other differences regarding not only the lexicon, but, say, phonological and phonetic 
features too. In cases like this, I’ll talk about fully-conscious-attunement or fc-
attunement, which can be understood in the following way: 
The agent x is fc-attuned to constraint C if and only if she is aw-attuned to C and 
she is also aware that C consists in S ⇒ S’. 
The difference is now that the agent has an explicit representation of the constraint or 
constraints; she is aware she’s attuned to. In this sense, we can say that she explicitly 
knows she’s attuned to constraint C: S ⇒ S’. This must not be confused, though, with 
knowledge of the constraint C: S ⇒ S’. In my view, the logical relation between these 
two statements is the following one: 
If the agent x is fc-attuned to C: S ⇒ S’, then she knows C: S ⇒ S’. 
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However, it is not the case that 
If the agent x knows C: S ⇒ S’, then she is fc-attuned to C: S ⇒ S’. 
And the same goes for s-and aw-attunement That is to say, knowledge of a constraint 
doesn’t involve attunement (in any of its modes: s-, aw- or fc-attunement). You may 
now that your Northern neighbors are attuned to the following constraint 
“Pinpilinpauxa” means butterfly, 
and thus your knowledge permits you to exploit (by means of a representation) that 
constraint when talking to them. You can understand their utterances and you can use 
that knowledge in yours. That doesn’t mean that you are automatically attuned to the 
constraint. In everyday life, talking to people of your town or abroad you will tend to 
use the word “tximeleta” for butterfly, if that’s the constraint you were attuned to from 
your childhood. 
Think about pedestrian street crossing. From the 193 countries currently recognized 
by the United Nations, 139 use right-hand-traffic (RHT) and 54 use left-hand-traffic 
(LHT) for vehicles.14 This implies that when a pedestrian is about to cross a (double-
direction) street in a RHT country, vehicles will come from her left, while in a LHT 
country they will come from her right but the knowledge of this does not lead to the 
pedestrian to be attuned to it. This is what happened to me the first time I went to 
London. I knew that I had to look to my right before crossing the street. I knew it 
because a friend had told me about it, and also because there are warnings painted on 
the road at many crossings telling you to “LOOK RIGHT”. Anyway, being attuned to 
traffic in a RHT country, I involuntarily put myself in various dangerous situations, 
                                                
14 Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Right- and left-hand traffic” (accessed May 20, 
2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-_and_left-hand_traffic 
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when I systematically looked to my left. Given my attunement, my explicit knowledge 
was quite useless. It took some time, some dangerous moments, and the angry car horns 
of local divers to get attuned to the constraint of LHT in the UK. 
These various modes of attunement and their difference with explicit knowledge 
are central to the constraint-based approach to culture that I develop in this work. 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented some basic notions from Situation Theory that I 
consider, not only relevant, but even critical to a naturalistic explanation of culture. We 
have seen that situations contain and carry information because of the systematic 
relations that there are between them. Or, in other words, because of the constraints that 
relate types of situations.  
It is then in virtue of agents being attuned to constraints that they can extract 
information form situations. More precisely “[a]ttunement to these constraints is what 
allows an agent to pick up information from one situation about another” (Barwise and 
Perry 1999 [1983]: 94).15 So the information agents pick up (or don’t) depends on the 
constraints agents are (or are not) attuned to. 
This shows that information is not a “thing” that passes from one brain to another. 
Instead, information is better seen as a phenomenon that arises from the attunement of 
agents to constraints. I have elaborated on the situation-theoretic notion of attunement, 
and have distinguished three different modes of being attuned, namely, s-attunement, 
aw-attunement and fc-attunement. These distinctions will permit me, in Chapters 3 and 
                                                
15 Emphasis mine. 
  32 
5, to shed some light on the notions of implicit and explicit knowledge, often invoked 
but rarely addressed in naturalistic approaches to culture.  
 
  33 
  
  34 
3. What is culture about? 
The Itemic View 
The Subject Matter of Culture 
More generally, aren’t words, songs, 
fashions, political ideals, cooking recipes, 
ethnic prejudices, folktales, and just about 
everything cultural, items that get copied 
again and again…? 
Sperber 2000: 164 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I am going to introduce three main current naturalistic approaches, that 
is, approaches that provide explanations of culture in causal and material terms without 
appealing to entities that go beyond human groups, or concepts that characterize human 
groups and their cultures in supernatural terms.16 The first approach I consider is called 
the epidemiological account (Sperber 1996; Atran 1990, 2002; Sperber and Claidière 
2006). Then I discuss the memetic account (Dawkins 2006 [1976], Dennett 1996) and, 
finally, the standard evolutionary approach to culture (Boyd and Richerson 1988 
[1985], Mesoudi 2011).  
                                                
16 In the late nineteenth-century and first half of the twentieth, culture, and social and 
psychological phenomena in general, were conceived as conforming or belonging to a 
different realm from the physical one, not reducible to the realm studied by natural sciences. 
The approaches considered here are the ones that abandoned that conception. 
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The three of them agree in considering culture “as that which is transmitted in a 
human group by non-genetic means” (Sperber 2000: 163). Another way to put it is the 
following: whatever it is “that” has the defining properties of the cultural:17 non-genetic 
transmission, stability and distribution in a group. The subject matter of culture, 
whatever it is, is non-genetically transmitted, it happens within a human group, and it is 
distributed as the outcome of some process of transmission that makes the subject 
matter stable in time. Which mechanisms are responsible for all this to happen is, of 
course, a vast topic.  
The aim of this chapter is to identify and clarify what “that” refers to in the general 
definition of culture, as understood by the three main naturalistic approaches to culture. 
While doing this, I will mention the mechanisms of transmission responsible for the 
distribution and stability of cultural “stuff,” but only as they serve to clarify the subject 
matter of culture according to those views. 
We will see that the three approaches share a common perspective, which I call the 
“Itemic View of Culture” or “IVC,” for short. According to this view, I contend, culture 
is constituted by certain items that meet certain conditions (most importantly, to be 
shared in a group through non-genetic means, to somehow endure in time, and have a 
significant spread within the group). By “item” I refer to the kind of things that these 
approaches take to be the subject matter of culture that they call “representations,” 
“memes” or, roughly speaking, information-packages that encompass physical or 
mental, private or public, abstract or concrete entities. What all these items have in 
common is that they are not constraints. In a nutshell, my point is that for the IVC all 
                                                
17 I borrow this notion from Sperber and Claidière 2008. It is not a technical term in the 
literature, but it captures what is considered to be cultural across naturalistic approaches. 
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these items, whatever the appropriateness of their role in the explanation, exclude an 
important part of the cultural subject matter, by ignoring constraints. 
3.2. The epidemiological account  
The epidemiological account is a “naturalistic program for the social sciences” (Sperber 
1996: 3) that seeks to provide a naturalistic explanation of culture.18 On the one side, it 
provides the theoretical means for explaining what are the items of which culture is 
made (items such as words, songs, fashions, political ideals, cooking recipes, ethnic 
prejudices, folktales, rules, skills and so on); and, at the same time, it proposes an 
explanation of how cultural items get distributed within human populations and why 
they demonstrate stability in time with a certain degree of variation. In a nutshell, as I 
take it, the epidemiological account understands culture as a collection of items non-
genetically transmitted and distributed in a stable manner in a human population, which 
are mental representations and public productions, that propagate forming causal chains 
called cultural cognitive causal chains, which preserve the information that characterize 
or individuates the cultural items. 
The epidemiological account is grounded on three things: a) an analogy between 
culture and epidemic phenomena; b) the claim that social sciences should proceed as 
epidemiological sciences do; and c) that social sciences have the necessary theoretical 
grounds to provide a naturalistic explanation of culture, with the resources of cognitive 
and computational sciences, which can provide the social sciences with grounds for a 
materialistic explanation of the notion of representation. 
                                                
18 See Atran 1990, 2002; Bloch and Sperber 2002; Boyer 1994, 2001; Sperber and Hirschfeld 
2004, 2006; Sperber 1985, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011). 
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3.2.1. The analogy 
The first point, the analogy, rests on some similarities between cultural phenomenon 
with epidemic disease. The idea is that cultural items like words, songs, fashions, 
political ideals, cooking recipes, ethnic prejudices, folktales, rules, skills, et cetera, 
spread in human populations as if they were a pathogen that gets passed from individual 
to individual. 
Think about the ideas in our brains as being potentially “contagious” cultural items 
in the following way.19 Some of our ideas determine how we behave, as, for example, 
my ideas about culture that caused me to write this dissertation. The behaviors or the 
traces left by our behavior are observable by others, e.g. my working fellows seeing me 
freaking out while I write, or your reading of these lines (these are traces of my 
behavior). Observing a behavior or its traces can give rise to ideas in the observers, like 
some of the ideas you are having right now. And sometimes, the ideas caused by an 
observed behavior or its traces resemble the ideas that caused the observed behavior or 
traces in question: This will be the case, for instance, if I achieve my goal of you 
understanding what is in these pages. When this process takes over, some ideas and its 
traces propagate within a population, e.g. imagine the very improbable (if not 
unrealistic) case of a version of this work, published in a book, translated into many 
different languages, and becoming a best seller so that the ideas in it are widely known 
and people talk about them. For the epidemiological account those propagated ideas and 
its traces are in a broad sense what culture is. 
Through a material process like the one just evoked, an idea, born in the brain of one 
individual, may have, in the brains of other individuals, descendants that resemble it. 
Ideas can be transmitted, and, by being transmitted from one person to another, they 
                                                
19 Example borrowed from Sperber 1996:1. 
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may even propagate. Some ideas—religious beliefs, cooking recipes, or scientific 
hypotheses, for instance—propagate so effectively that, in different versions, they may 
end up durably invading whole populations. Culture is made up, first and foremost, of 
such contagious ideas. It is made up also of all the productions (writings, artworks, 
tools, etc.) the presence of which in the shared environment of a human group permits 
the propagation of ideas. (Sperber 1996: 1) 
The point is that this propagation pattern (from one individual to others) shown by 
culture somehow resembles the spread of diseases, so “[t]o explain culture, then, is to 
explain why and how some ideas happen to be contagious. This calls for the 
development of a true epidemiology of representation” (Sperber 1996: 1). 
3.2.2. The methodological claim 
The second reason for giving an epidemiological account of culture is related to how 
social sciences should proceed. Epidemiology is a science that seeks to explain how 
disease turns out to be propagated such that a “whole” population is infected. The way 
to figure out how this happens requires the collaboration of biology and environmental 
sciences. The combination of these two disciplines is how scientists understand the 
disease’s life cycle, how it is transmitted between individuals, in which conditions, and 
so on and so forth. It is by the collaboration of sciences that arrive at a deep 
understanding of the micro-level phenomena involved in epidemics that the propagation 
and distribution of the disease as a macro-level phenomenon gets explained, so that we 
can stop the epidemic.  
How could one go about trying to fit social things into nature, in other words, 
‘naturalize’ them? Here, cognitive science is relevant in more ways than one. A 
naturalistic programme is one that establishes fundamental continuities between its 
domain and that of one or several neighbouring natural sciences. Psychological 
sciences are the social sciences’ closest neighbours, and some of their programmes—
roughly those falling under the ‘cognitive science’ label—are in the process of being 
more or less successfully naturalized. Naturalizing the social domain would 
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presumably involve establishing some continuity with programmes in cognitive 
science. (Sperber 1996: 4-5) 
As I take it, the underlying idea is analogous to that of methodological 
individualism for the ontology of social phenomena: social macro-phenomena are the 
outcome of (and explicable by) individual and interpersonal micro-phenomena. If we 
then want to explain cultural macro-phenomena such as religion, language, social 
structure and so on, we need to see how those arise from micro-cultural phenomena 
such as communication, imitation, learning, cognition and so on, and for that social 
sciences should seek collaboration with neighboring sciences like psychology, 
environmental sciences, anthropology, cognitive sciences and so on. 
An epidemiology of representations will attempt to explain cultural macro-phenomena 
as the cumulative effect of two types of micro-mechanisms: individual mechanisms 
that bring about the formation and transformation of mental representations, and inter-
individual mechanisms that, through alterations of the environment, bring about the 
transmission of representations. (Sperber 1996: 50) 
All epidemiological models, whatever their differences, have in common the fact that 
they explain population-scale macro-phenomena, such as epidemics, as the cumulative 
effect of micro-processes that bring about individual events, such as catching a 
disease. In this, epidemiological models contrast starkly with ‘holistic’ explanations, 
in which macro-phenomena are explained in terms of other macro-phenomena—for 
instance, religion in terms of economic structure (or conversely). (Sperber 1996: 2) 
The point is that an epidemiological approach to culture is conceived as the 
collaboration between anthropology with neighboring sciences so that we can explain 
how it is that “[t]he human mind is susceptible to cultural representations in the same 
way as the human organism is susceptible to diseases” (Sperber 1996: 57), such that it 
causes cultural items to show an epidemic-like distribution pattern.  
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3.2.3. The grounds for naturalizing culture 
The third point is that the development of computational sciences during the 20th 
century has shown how information can be implemented in material processes:  
[T]he development of computers, and important advances in neurology for the impact 
of Turing’s discovery on psychology to be felt, and for a truly materialist approach to 
cognition to begin emerging. (Sperber 1996: 13) 
Thus, the social sciences could develop a better understanding of how information is 
implemented in our brains. The epidemiological account anchors representations to the 
natural world by providing an explanation of representations and chains of 
representation which will account for macro-level phenomena. So with the help of 
computational sciences, Sperber’s goal is to provide a materialistic account of cultural 
representations which aims to be “precise enough to help bridge the gap between the 
cognitive and the social sciences” (Sperber 2006: 432-433). 
For at least some formulations of the epidemiological account, culture is just the 
collection of all instances of cultural items in people’s brains and their environment. Yet 
for other formulations, cultural items seem to be information or contents (either 
communicative or imitative), leaving aside somehow the fact that mental 
representations and public productions are necessary for cultural items to exist. Since 
this is the case, let’s go through these two formulations. 
3.2.4. Culture as distributed representations and public productions 
A difficulty in explaining culture, is that cultural items such as stories have many 
versions and many more tokens (tales, writings, audio records, memories….). We can 
describe some of these tokens as the media in which the story is stored (either in 
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people’s brains or on external devices: books, tapes, CDs, mp3 files…), but also as the 
media for transmitting the cultural item. 
The epidemiological account describes those tokens as representations and public 
productions. Memories, beliefs, intentions, items of knowledge are considered mental 
representations. Story-tellings, audio recordings, gestures, artifacts, rituals (in sum, 
behaviors or their traces in the world) are described as public productions, of which 
public representations are a special kind. 
The fact that cultural items can be of such variety, makes it hard to answer or 
discern what actually is (ontologically speaking) a story like Little Red Riding Hood, 
and this is also the case for many, perhaps most, cultural items. 
In this subsection, I argue that it is reasonable to think that the epidemiological 
account takes culture essentially as a collection of items. Think of it in the following 
way. If there were no books, memories, tales and so on there would be no cultural item 
such as Little Red Riding Hood. Besides, if I invent a story, but I don’t tell anybody 
about it, it is not cultural because nobody else knows the story. There would be no 
transmission so it would not become a cultural item. 
For Sperber, what makes a song, a fashion, political ideals, cooking recipes, ethnic 
prejudices, folktales, et cetera, cultural is their being widely distributed in a population 
of mental representations and public productions. 
[W]hat caused the Mornay sauce recipe or the story of ‘Little Red Riding Hood’ to 
become cultural representations is not—or rather, is not directly—their formal 
properties; it is the construction of millions of mental representations causally linked 
by millions of public representations. (Sperber 1996: 63) 
This means that what makes an item cultural (in this case a recipe or a story) is the fact 
of there being a large enough number of representations and public productions of it, 
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widely distributed.20 On the other hand, its representations and public productions have 
to remain stable throughout the process of distribution. That is, what makes Little Red 
Riding Hood, the belief in any kind of god, a tool, a rule, or any item that comes to your 
mind a cultural one, is that they are widely distributed within a human population. 
When we speak of cultural representations, we have in mind—or should have in 
mind—such widely distributed, lasting representations. Cultural representations so 
understood are a fuzzy subset of the set of mental and public representations 
inhabiting a given social group. (Sperber 1996: 33)21 
It is worth noting that, it is not just the fact that there are “millions” of instances of 
a given mental representation or a public production that makes a cultural item cultural. 
It is the “impact” a cultural item has in people’s minds that seems to be relevant for 
Sperber: 
The cultural importance of a public production is to be measured not by the number of 
copies in the environment but by their impact on people’s minds (Sperber 1996: 104) 
This passage refers to a comparison of the impact on people’s lives and minds of 
spam mail (letter chains)—of which there can be millions of instances of the same 
item—, on the one hand, and scientific ideas, on the other, of which there might be just 
a few instances in people’s brains and public productions (such as articles), but whose 
impact can be observed across the whole population.  
Thus, the epidemiological account explains culture in terms of mental 
representations and public productions distributed across a population. The notion of 
                                                
20 Generally speaking, as we will see, when Sperber talks about culture as information, how 
widely distributed the information is seems to play a role in its designation as cultural. 
Nevertheless, there is no clear ratio of population to candidates for cultural items, which 
distinguishes cultural distribution from mere local distribution. 
21 He is referring by cultural representations to mental and public representations, but more 
generally to cultural items, of which of some public productions that are not representations 
play an essential part. 
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representation is based on the everyday notion of representation: an object or event 
(physical or mental) that stands for another object or event for someone (Sperber 1985: 
11). Think about an image (a picture, a painting) or a description (written or spoken) of 
a particular computer, a map of a geographic area, my perception of a particular 
computer, the tale of Little Red Riding Hood I know from my grandma, or her belief in 
God, and so on and so forth. 
This account distinguishes two kinds of representation: mental and public. Mental 
representations such as ideas, beliefs, memories, perceptions and the like: 
[M]ental representations are brain states described in functional terms, and it is the 
material interaction between brains, organisms and environment which explains the 
distribution of these representations. (Sperber 1996:28) 
Examples of public representations are “speech, gestures, writing, and pictures” 
which “are a special type of public productions whose function is to communicate a 
content” (Sperber 1996: 32; Sperber and Hirschfeld 2006:149). By “public production,” 
in turn, Sperber means 
(…) any perceptible modification of the environment brought about by human 
behaviour. Productions include bodily movements and the outcomes of such 
movements. Some productions are long-lasting, like clothes or buildings; others are 
ephemeral, like a grin or the sounds of speech. (Sperber 1996: 99) 
But how is the process of “culturization” of an item like? Sperber describes how an 
item (a song, fashion, political ideals, cooking recipes, ethnic prejudices, folktales, et 
cetera) gets distributed by chains of representations and public productions. The 
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epidemiological account distinguishes between various kinds of chains of 
representations for explaining culture: cognitive, social and cultural.22  
A cognitive chain is a process that happens within an individual’s mind/brain. Let’s 
take the example of the tale of Little Red Riding Hood. My grandma has many mental 
representations, and among them, are the funny memories of her mother telling the tale 
of Little Red Riding Hood. This mental representation gets involved in her thinking, 
which leads her to the belief that I could enjoy the tale as she did. And this belief causes 
in her the desire to tell me the tale she remembers.23 This is a cognitive chain. 
According to Sperber (2001, 2006, 2011), cognitive chains are causal interactions 
between perceptions, inference processes, memories and beliefs, that is, causal chains of 
mental representations within an individual:  
Typically, public productions have mental representations among their causes and 
among their effects. Mental representations caused by public productions can in turn 
cause further public productions, that can cause further mental representations, and so 
forth. There are thus complex causal chains where mental representations and public 
productions alternate. Public productions are likely to have many mental 
representations among their causes, and, conversely, every link in a causal chain may 
be attached to many others, both up and down the causal path. (Sperber 1996: 99) 
The cognitive chain in my grandma’s mind/brain might end up causing my grandma to 
actually tell me the tale of Little Red Riding Hood. If she does so, and produces a public 
representation which affects me, she creates a social (cognitive causal) chain. Her 
telling of Little Red Riding Hood causes a mental representation of the tale in my mind. 
If things go right, the mental representation of the tale created in my mind would be 
                                                
22 Sperber’s (2001, 2006, 2011) terminology is a bit more complicated. He calls these kinds of 
chain, respectively, “cognitive causal chain,” “social cognitive causal chain” and “cultural 
cognitive causal chain.” Probably “net” or “network” are better terms than “chain” for the 
latter suggests a one-to-one relation, while the former allow branching. 
23 I do not believe that reality works exactly this way. I am just following a similar example to 
the one Sperber provides (Sperber 1996: 61-62). 
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accurate enough to (resemble minimally) the one in my grandma’s mind, that is, my 
mental representation of the tale contains the “same” information that my grandma’s 
mental representation has. This way, the representation of Little Red Riding Hood has 
been transmitted from my grandma to me. Thus, a social chain starts with a cognitive 
chain within an individual’s mind that by means of a public representation triggers a 
cognitive chain in another individual: 
Of particular interest are causal chains from mental representations to public 
productions to mental representations and so on, where the causal descendants of a 
representation resemble it in content. The smallest ordinary such causal chain is an act 
of successful communication. Typically, the public productions that are involved in 
communication are public representations such as linguistic utterances. Public 
representations are artefacts the function of which is to ensure a similarity of content 
between one of their mental causes in the communicator and one of their mental 
effects in the audience. (Sperber 1996: 99) 
Finally, a cultural chain occurs when the social chain involving the same 
represented item (in this case, the tale) gets repeated. That is to say, when I tell my niece 
the tale I remember, and then she tells it to her siblings and so on, a cultural chain has 
begun. When this process goes over and over, we have a cultural chain in which the 
information that constitutes the tale gets passed repeatedly, and minimally transformed, 
along the chain. Communication, of course, plays an important role in the generation of 
cultural chains: 
A typical example of a SCCC [social cognitive causal chain] that preserves the content 
of mental representations is provided by communication. Communication between two 
people involves two complementary cognitive processes, one of expression and one of 
interpretation. The communicator expresses a mental representation by producing 
some public representation. This representation is then interpreted by the receiver, 
yielding, if all goes well, a mental representation similar enough to the one that had 
been expressed by the communicator. (Sperber and Claidière 2006b: 437) 
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Thus, to sum up, according to the epidemiological account as I take it, a culture is a 
collection or set of cultural chains. The common informational content of the mental 
and public representations involved in a cultural chain constitutes the subject matter of 
culture. In other words, a mental representation q that has a content ϕ causes a public 
representation p which has the content ϕ‘, and a receiver of p transforms this public 
representation into a mental one y which has the content ϕ‘’, and ϕ, ϕ‘ and ϕ‘’ have a 
minimal resemblance in content. Only when this process takes place a significant 
number of times can the informational content be spread widely in a human group, and 
only then will the content be considered a cultural item: “only those representations 
which are repeatedly communicated and minimally transformed in the process will end 
up belonging to the culture” (Sperber 1996: 83). Quoting Sperber at length, this is the 
overall picture of the epidemiological approach to culture: 
A human population is inhabited by a much wider population of mental 
representations of all kinds: beliefs, values, techniques, projects, intentions and so on. 
These mental representations are distributed in the brains of individuals. Behaviours 
are caused by mental representations, the behaviour of an individual, for instance 
walking or speaking, may be perceptible to other individuals, or it may leave 
perceptible traces, for instance footsteps or writing, I call such perceptible behaviours 
and traces “public productions.” The public productions of an individual may provide 
an input to the mental processes of other individuals causing them to construct their 
own mental representations. These representations can in turn result in public 
productions which can trigger the construction of yet other mental representations in 
other individuals and so on. A human group is thus crisscrossed by a mesh of causal 
chains where mental and environmental links alternate. Everything social, I would 
argue, is caught in that mesh. (Sperber 2017 [1997])24 
At this point a clarification is needed. Consider that there are as many mental 
representations of Little Red Riding Hood as people that know the tale and also that 
there are many public representation: books, audio records, films and cartoons of the 
                                                
24 Being a web version, it has no page numbers. 
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tale. Think that all those representations conform to the range of different versions of 
Little Red Riding Hood. In some of them the main character brings wine, in others 
honey; in some the grandma and Little Red Riding Hood are saved by a hunter or a 
woodcutter, but in others they are not saved; not taking into account the differences in 
how people tell the tale. We can say then that there are different cultural chains of the 
tale. What then is the tale Little Red Riding Hood? According to the epidemiological 
account, the tale Little Red Riding Hood is the information that all representations of the 
tale have in common, and it is by means of this information that we recognize in them 
(the representations) the tale Little Red Ridding Hood. “[I]t is by their content rather 
than by their material properties that we tend to identify representations” (Sperber 2001: 
303). 
This could lead to a misunderstanding because the representations and the 
information they contain are two different things: What is culture then? The 
representations, that is, the objects and events that contain information or the 
information common to all of them? 
The epidemiological account answers this by considering the tale of Little Red 
Riding Hood as an abstract representation that is the common information to every 
representation of the tale. It is in this sense that we should understand what Sperber 
means when he says that a tale is a representation despite all the differences that may 
take place in the instantiations of it. 
Summing up, the main idea for the epidemiological approach is that cultures are the 
collections of items shared in a social group: ideas, beliefs, tales, customs, artifacts... 
This account conceives a cultural item in terms of representations and the information 
contained in them. Thus, a cultural item is a chain of mental and public representations. 
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Those chains are called “cultural cognitive causal chains” and those are the ones that 
preserve the information that characterize cultural items. The explanation of cultural 
items is not exhausted by actual public or mental representations, they are best 
understood by abstracting the common information to the representations that constitute 
the cultural item. That is, it turns out that for the epidemiological account culture is a 
collection of items identified as representations by information contained in them.  
I want to point to three related aspects that mark the differences between this 
account and the constraint-based approach I defend. First, it is quite clear that the 
epidemiological approach is an IV or Itemic View, because it takes the subject matter of 
culture as being constituted by (mental or public) representations and chains of them. 
Thus, second, the role of constraints in the production of behavior, and in the account of 
the very notion of information (central to the epidemiological approach) goes unnoticed. 
And, third, the distribution of the cultural subject matter in a human population is 
exclusively through transmission (communication, imitation, copying…), ignoring what 
is, to my mind, the fundamental means of cultural distribution, the simple attunement to 
a conventional constraint. I’ll elaborate this in the next chapter. Now, I want to consider 
the second main naturalistic approach to culture: memetics.  
3.3. The memetic account 
The memetic account of culture is a naturalistic approach that is based on a strong 
analogy with biological evolutionary theories. In a nutshell, for the memetic account, 
culture is a collection of memes (entities that get replicated in the process of 
transmission mostly by imitation), which are information in brains and objects. In other 
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words, what is commonly understood by culture (songs, ideas, beliefs, tales, customs...) 
are, for this view, memes. 
This account arises from a biological evolutionary theoretical framework adapted to 
an account of culture. As Dennett (1996: 343) argued following Dawkins 2006 [1976], 
to be considered evolutionary, a process must fulfill the following conditions: 
- Variation or fecundity: there is a continuing abundance of different elements. 
- Heredity or replication: the elements have the capacity to create copies or 
replicas of themselves. 
- Differential “fitness”: the number of copies of an element that is created in a 
given time varies depending on interactions between the features of that element 
and features of the environment in which it persists. 
Back in the 60’s, there was a debate about the subject matter of biological 
evolution, species or genes. The above characterization of evolution explains the 
mechanism of evolutionary processes. On this view, “elements” become central to the 
explanation of any evolutionary process, and whatever they are, they have to meet such 
conditions. As I understand it, the debate was settled by distinguishing between which 
are and what are those elements of biological evolution. To the question of which the 
elements of biological evolution are, the answer was genes. But to the question of what 
these elements are, Dawkins proposed the notion of replicator (Dawkins 2006 [1976]). 
The notion of replicator was meant to explain any evolutionary process. It is based 
on in a generalization of the features observed in genes, that is, replicators are the 
entities (the elements) with the capacity to create copies or replicas of themselves given 
the proper conditions. Thus, if there is something with the capacity of replicating with 
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variation in an environment with finite resources, an evolutionary process should take 
place.  
The view that the presence of a replicator is central to any evolutionary process, 
opened the possibility of thinking about genes as just one kind of replicator among other 
possible ones (Dawkins 2006 [1976]: 194), which led to the idea of other possible 
evolutionary processes. This conception of evolution raised the question of whether 
there could be more evolutionary processes operating on our planet apart from the 
biological one that we are familiar with. 
But do we have to go to distant worlds to find other kinds of replicator and other, 
consequent, kinds of evolution? I think that a new kind of replicator has recently 
emerged on this very planet. It is staring us in the face (Dawkins 2006 [1976]: 192).  
This was the starting point for the memetic account: culture is constituted by a 
“new” kind of replicator. The underlying assumption of a memetic account is the 
following: given that cultural items (some songs, tunes, stories, ideas, skills and so on) 
pass from generation to generation of humans by what seems like a copying process 
with little variation, these are non-genetically inheritable. They also show the feature of 
variation, and differential fitness. In conclusion, cultural items are subject to selection 
processes (like natural selection) by the environment, and culture is an evolutionary 
process.25 
From the memetic point of view the human being (with its clever thinking brain) acts 
both as the replicating machinery, and as the selective environment for the memes. 
(Blackmore 1999: 15) 
                                                
25 There is an interesting debate about evolutionary theory and evolution kinds surrounding 
culture: Claidière et. al 2014, Henrich et. al 2008 claim that there can be evolution process 
without the need of a replicator-like entity. 
  51 
So, if any evolutionary process must have a replicator and if culture is an 
evolutionary process, then, there must be a replicator in culture: “we need a name for 
the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of cultural transmission or a 
unit of imitation,” and this is meme (Dawkins 2006 [1976]: 192). The memetic approach 
takes cultural items as memes; memes are the subject matter of culture. 
There has been a lot of discussion about their very existence and their 
appropriateness as theoretical concepts to explain culture.26 But what are they? 
3.3.1. Extensional definition of meme 
Generally speaking, a common way to define culture is by extension, “on the basis of 
observed behaviors and artifacts” (Lyman and O’Brien 2003). The memetic approach 
explains what memes are by identifying them with cultural items. That is, by the 
extension of the word “culture.” 
Dawkins refers to “tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making 
pots or of building arches” (Dawkins 2006 [1976]: 192) as clear examples of memes. 
Here Dawkins picks up things that tend to be copied. He mentions that it is the fact of 
their “psychological appeal” that makes us copy (or replicate) them. We can think of 
them as viruses too. That would be similar to the epidemiological notion, but even 
closer to software viruses (Dawkins 1993; Lynch 1996; Brodie 2004 [1996]) spreading 
in the minds of individuals of a population. This is what nowadays is meant when some 
news, a video, a gif and the like goes viral. These are memes too. 
For Dennett the underlying notion is very similar, but he takes the concept of 
memes to apply basically to ideas. 
                                                
26 See Aunger 2000. 
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[T]hese new replicators are, roughly, ideas. Not the ‘simple ideas’ of Locke and Hume 
(the idea of red, or the idea of round or hot or cold), but the sort of complex ideas that 
form themselves into distinct memorable units⎯ such as the ideas of: arch, wheel, 
wearing clothes, vendetta, right triangle, impressionism … (Dennett 1991: 201, 1996: 
344) 
The line of thought again is the following one: since everything cultural is 
transmitted (whatever the mechanism) from individual to individual, and thus to 
populations, the very fact that it is transmitted implies that they are copied somehow. 
Given this view, cultural things fit in the notion of memes. The notion of memes is, in 
this sense, a generic notion that captures what is commonly considered culture. The lists 
above make clear that for the memetic approach cultural items are memes, and 
therefore, culture is constituted by memes. 
Although the things they refer to as memes are mostly mental objects, we will see 
in the next subsection that, for the memetic account, memes are not just ideas, or things 
in people’s brains/minds. For the moment, one might think that ideas, thoughts and 
beliefs in general are memes, but 
we should remember that not all thoughts are memes. In principle, our immediate 
perceptions and emotions are not memes because they are ours alone, and we may 
never pass them on. (Blackmore 1999: 15) 
So, what does make them memes or culture? All the things mentioned above share 
a feature according to the memetic account: they are things that are mostly transmitted 
by imitation. 
3.3.2. Memes as what is imitated 
A way to characterize what memes are, then, is by looking at their transmission. Despite 
some mention of verbal communication (Dawkins 2006 [1976]:193; Blackmore 1999: 
34), according to the memetic account, memes propagate themselves in the meme pool 
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by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in a broad sense, can be called 
“imitation” (Dawkins 2006 [1976]: 192). 
When one person imitates another, a meme is transmitted from one brain to 
another: a meme has been replicated. Imagine that I hum a tune that I have in my mind 
and when another person imitates me because of the characteristics the meme has 
(because they like it, it reminds them of something, or for its simplicity) and this person 
gets the tune, memeticists would say that the tune (a meme) has been transmitted 
(Blackmore 1999: 1-9). 
A further step from this is to fully identify memes with whatever is imitated. The 
idea would be that if a person imitates another and succeeds, a meme has been 
transmitted from one person to another.27 In Blackmore’s words: 
Everything that is passed from person to person in this way [imitation] is a meme. This 
includes all the words in your vocabulary, the stories you know, the skills and habits 
you have picked up from others and games you like to play. It includes the songs you 
sing and the rules you obey. (Blackmore 1999: 7) 
She identifies “everything” that gets passed from person to person by imitation as 
memes, and that “all” cultural items one knows or uses are things that one knows and 
uses because they have been “passed” (transmitted) by imitation. 28 
                                                
27An integral idea to this is that we (our brains, among other supports like books, computers and 
movies) are the vehicles for memes as we (our bodies) are the vehicles of our genes (Dawkins 
1982). 
28Notice that the issue of degree of distribution for an idea to be a meme vanishes with this way 
of looking at culture. If something is imitated just once, it is a meme and, therefore, cultural: 
its degree of success at being distributed seems to be what characterizes it as an evolutionarily 
“good” or “bad” meme, but not as cultural or a cultural thing. 
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3.3.3. Memes as information 
When it is said that something is copied, there are two different senses of “copying.” 
One makes a copy when one makes a new object that resembles another object, or 
performs an action that resembles another action. Take, for instance, a ceramic pot I 
made by looking at a model pot, or my first ever greeting of someone in Japan, by 
copying the movements (bowing) of my friend Noritaka. In this sense, copying would 
amount to imitation. 
A different way of copying is when someone produces an object or causes an event 
that contains information about an event. Think of my utterance “the coffee is hot” 
while pointing to a cup filled with hot coffee. Kepa translates what I said uttering “kafea 
beroa dago” to a friend that does not understand English. Kepa didn’t imitate my 
utterance, but producing an utterance with the same content, he somehow produced a 
copy of it, without “re-producing” it. The same thing would happen with habits:  
Let me pause to ask the question: what is such a habit made of? What gets passed from 
individual to individual when a habit is copied? Not stuff, not packets of material, but 
pure information, the information that generates the pattern of behavior that replicates. 
A cultural virus, unlike a biological virus, is not tethered to any particular physical 
medium of transmission. (Dennett 1999: 317-318) 
That is, in part, an aspect of the memetic account’s strong analogy with biological 
evolution. In biology, broadly speaking, what is transmitted from one generation to 
another are genes and scientists talk about them as information.29  
The memetic approach assumes that “we know that memes are just information 
being copied from one person to another” (Blackmore 1999: 204). This, along with the 
view of Dennett that “what is preserved and transmitted in cultural evolution is 
                                                
29About the use of the metaphor “genetic code,” “genetic information”... see (Knudsen 2005). 
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information” (1996: 353), leaves no doubt about their claim: culture is a collection of 
items (memes) that are the information that humans transmit by imitation. 
A meme should be regarded as a unit of information residing in a brain (Cloak’s ‘i-
culture’). It has a definite structure, realized in whatever physical medium the brain 
uses for storing information. If the brain stores information as a pattern of synaptic 
connections, a meme should in principle be visible under a microscope as a definite 
pattern of synaptic structure. (Dawkins 1982: 109) 
Nevertheless, despite that a meme is not bound to “any particular medium of 
transmission,” according to Dennett, the very existence of memes relies on being 
instantiated in a physical medium: 
Memes are also invisible, and are carried by meme vehicles—pictures, books, sayings 
(in particular languages, oral or written, on paper or magnetically encoded, etc.). Tools 
and buildings and other inventions are also meme vehicles. A wagon with spoked 
wheels carries not only grain or freight from place to place; it carries the brilliant idea 
of a wagon with spoked wheels from mind to mind. A meme’s existence depends on a 
physical embodiment in some medium; if all such physical embodiments are 
destroyed, that meme is extinguished. (Dennett 1991: 204) 
Up to now, memes have been defined as the units of cultural transmission or 
imitation in cultural evolution. So, memes are the replicators of cultural evolution 
analogous to genes, that is to say, memes are chunks of information “stored” in our 
brains and the objects in our environment, which replicate. Memes are replicated by 
imitation, and by this way the information that constitutes memes gets transmitted from 
brain to brain or other object in which they are instantiated. 
3.3.4. Memes as instructions 
At this point, another remark needs to be made. The idea of memes being analogous to 
genes may suggest that memes are copied with the same high-fidelity rate as genes; that 
cultural evolution may be, at least in theory, a high-fidelity copying process. 
  56 
This issue caused some debate. Some positions arose against memetics as a 
possible explanation of culture and of how the process of cultural transmission works 
(Sperber 1996, 2000; Kuper 2000; Bloch 2000). For these authors, it is inconceivable 
that culture is based on a-high fidelity process run by a self-replicating entity, since, 
among other reasons, “[i]n the process of transmission, representations are transformed” 
(Sperber 1996: 53). 
Naturalistic approaches agree that culture shows stability, so, there must be some 
mechanism in the process of transmission responsible for that. For non-memetic 
accounts, this stability is not due to the self-replicating characteristic of memes. In fact, 
they claim that cultural transmission has a “low” fidelity rate. That is to say, in every 
step of the transmission the information gets transformed to some degree. Roughly 
speaking, they locate the causes of the stability of cultural information not in the 
information itself but in the cognitive biases and capabilities of the human mind 
(Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004, 2006). 
The debate led to a final version of memetics which refines the notion of meme in 
terms of information by getting closer to the analogy with genetic information. Inspired 
by the distinction of F. T. Cloak (1975) between "i-culture" and "m-culture,” Dawkins 
distinguishes between the meme (the information, e.g. the idea of chair) and its 
phenotypic expressions (e.g. an actual chair). This is analogous to the genotype and the 
phenotype distinction in biology, which is the difference between the genes of an 
organism and the expression of those genes in the organism (Dawkins 1982: 109).  
From this perspective memes are information consisting in instructions for 
producing a mind-external object, e.g. a behavior or an artifact, just as the information 
of genes which is described as the instructions to make an organism. The memetic 
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account of culture, then, makes a distinction between information and what information 
produces, e.g. between my idea of a chair and the chair (the product of following the 
idea). This is how memes are defined as instructions (thought as a kind of information, 
that of which the meme is “made of”) and what is produced by following the 
instructions (the objects that contain them, ranging from tools to words). 
By this distinction, the memetic account tries to solve the problems of high-fidelity 
and explains how memes can be in people’s minds and in artifacts. Dawkins gives an 
example to illustrate the point (Dawkins 1999). His father shows him how to make a 
Chinese junk of paper. He watches him and imitates what his father does, and in the 
end, he gets a Chinese junk. Afterwards, he showed it to a friend at school. Later, all the 
children were making Chinese junks.  
The point is that if one observes all the junks, one will notice that they are different, 
due to, say, the differences in the ability of the individuals and the loss of steps in the 
transmission of how they are built. Dawkins’ conclusion is that we do not copy the junk 
(the phenotype), what we copy are the instructions (the genotype) we follow to do the 
junk. So, as cited before, memes are information that are instructions and the junks are 
the instances of these instructions. 
By understanding memes as instructions, the memetic account can explain why 
people, having the same meme (instructions) in their brains, may yet express that meme 
differently. This could be theoretically a reasonable explanation, given that the 
differences between tokens of the same cultural item vanish, since the actual cultural 
item is the meme, which remains “intact.” This is not a definitive solution, since 
memetics acknowledges that we can copy memes from their phenotypic expressions, 
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which will mean that somehow they include the instructions, so they are somehow a 
meme too. 30 
[W]ords are memes that can be pronounced. Other memes are the same sort of thing—
information packets or recipes for doing something other than pronouncing—
behaviors such as shaking hands or making a particular rude gesture, or taking off 
your shoes when you enter a house, or driving on the right, or making your boats 
symmetrical. (Dennett 2007: 81) 
3.3.5. Memeplex 
This is an extension that the memetic account makes, following the analogy with 
genetic evolution. 
Some memes survive and evolve so that they co-adapt forming “meme-complexes” 
(Dawkins 2006 [1976]: 192) or “memeplexes”: “The essence of any memeplex is that 
the memes inside it can replicate better as part of the group [the memeplex] than they 
can on their own” (Blackmore 1999: 20). 
As it has happens with genes, the chances for a meme to survive may increase with 
other memes, or the replication of a meme might help other memes replicate. The 
classic example for this in memetics is religion. A more simple example would be 
something like the parental advice to kids: “Good children keep their clothes clean,” 
“Nice people say please and thanks.” These are some of the examples given by Susan 
Blackmore (1999: 169). She describes these utterances as instances of collaboration 
between two memes: the ideas of “good” and “nice” with some behavioral instructions. 
According to her, these two appear frequently together because one supports the other. 
                                                
30As far as I can tell, the memetic approach offers no clear explanation of where a meme begins 
and ends. For example, when they talk about songs or tunes they do not clarify if there is one 
or several memes or if the tune is a meme complex, that is, a memeplex. 
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A more complex example would be the one of religion. Religion would be a cluster 
of the memes of: “God,” “faith,” “life after death,” “hell” et cetera. Having faith implies 
belief in God, not believing in God implies going to hell, all those supported by the idea 
that life continues after death. Those memes are not isolated but at the same time are not 
in the same clusters (religions). 
3.3.6. Culture as self-replicating memes 
Concerning the subject matter of culture, it is clear that, for the memetic account, 
culture consists of a collection of memes that are transmitted by “imitation.” Memes are 
representations and replicators: they use our brains to make copies of themselves, as 
genes use cell machinery to make copies. Memes are then a 100% successful 
transmission of representations and should be treated “in cultural transmission not as the 
norm but as a limiting case (of 100 per cent influence)” (Sperber 1996: 106). The 
cultural items that constitute culture are then memes, which are information stored in 
brains and in non-mental objects such us artifacts and behaviors, and transmitted by 
copying. They are instructions for making copies of themselves. Those are the items 
that constitute culture for this account: memes. 
3.4. The standard evolutionary account 
The standard evolutionary approach to culture is the third and last attempt to naturalize 
culture that I consider.31 In this case, the idea is to do it in a quantitative way. The 
                                                
31I take the name for this approach from Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015. They distinguish between 
two views: the standard cultural evolution approach and the Sperberian cultural attraction 
approach. From my point of view, the epidemiological account and the standard evolutionary 
account (with the exception of Mesoudi et al. 2004) consider culture to be transmitted in non-
discrete units as the memetic approach proposes. On the other hand, the epidemiological 
  60 
approach is based in an analogy between culture and biological evolution, and seeks to 
explain culture by applying the mathematical models from population genetics to 
culture, or more precisely, to what I have been calling “cultural items.”  
As I take it, the authors in this approach have as a starting point the idea that the 
social sciences are at a stage very similar to the beginnings of the theories in biological 
evolution, being “based on informal and nonquantitative methods” (Mesoudi 2011: xi). 
In biological evolution, what nowadays is known as “the evolutionary synthesis” took 
place thanks to models developed in the 1920’s by British and American 
mathematically inclined biologists, who created models that “allowed these informal 
intuitions [whether biological evolution was Lamarckian or Darwinian] to be tested far 
more precisely than is possible with informal, verbal arguments and thought 
experiments” (Mesoudi 2011: 48-51). 
In the 80’s Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981 applied the mathematical models that 
described the genetic distribution of human populations to culture. This way, they 
created the models for explaining the distribution of culture. These models described 
three micro-evolutionary processes of transmission: vertical (parents to children), 
oblique (from unrelated elders), and horizontal (within generations), from one to one or 
from one to many and so on.32 
                                                                                                                                          
account argues that the process of cultural evolution is not based on selection (but in 
preservative and reconstructive processes) while the standard evolutionary approach proposes 
a model that captures the epidemiological explanation plus selection. See Henrich and Boyd 
2002; Sperber and Claidière 2008, 2014; Henrich et al. 2008. 
32Furthermore, they ran some experiments in which they wanted to see if the predicted 
distribution of cultural items was close to that of the data collected. Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1982, 
surveyed Stanford students and parents and friends asking about their religious and political 
beliefs, sports and entertainment preferences, and daily habits, to test their models against 
actual data. 
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Just after Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, Boyd and Richerson (1988 [1985], 2005) 
developed the approach further. They refined and expanded their models, describing, 
among other things, the idea of how “cultural selection” works:33 
any condition where one cultural trait is more likely to be acquired and passed on than 
an alternative cultural trait (or no trait at all). Unlike guided variation, cultural 
selection does not involve any modification of the trait itself, only changes in the 
frequency of that trait. (Mesoudi 2011: 65) 
Broadly speaking, there are three classes of cultural selection, which are defined as 
biases in the transmission of culture: content, model-based and frequency-dependent 
biases. Content bias consists in the selection of cultural traits by their intrinsic 
advantages and disadvantages or inherent psychological attraction: 
Individuals are more likely to learn or remember some cultural variants based on their 
content. Content-based bias can result from calculation of costs and benefits associated 
with alternative variants, or because the structure of cognition makes some variants 
easier to learn or remember. (Boyd and Richerson 2005: 69) 
Frequency-based bias consists in the selection of cultural traits by their frequency 
presence. They relate the degree of adoption of a cultural item, to the frequency of that 
item in the population. There are two possibilities: adoption, because of high frequency, 
called “conformity,” or, because of scarcity, called “anti-conformity.” 
The use of the commonness or rarity of a cultural variant as a basis for choice. For 
example, the most advantageous variant is often likely to be the commonest. If so, a 
conformity bias is an easy way to acquire the correct variant. (Boyd and Richerson 
2005; 69) 
                                                
33This is not the only mechanism or “force” that operates in cultural evolution that they 
observed. They defined models for explaining cultural mutation, guide variation, cultural drift 
and so on (Boyd and Richerson 1988 [1985], 2006), which all operate on the same assumption 
that I’m trying to illustrate in this chapter: that for naturalistic approaches culture is a 
collection of items. 
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Model-based bias describes the cases in which there is a relation between a cultural 
trait and a person. It concerns the identity of the person, the model, from whom cultural 
traits are acquired:  
Model-based bias. Choice of trait based on the observable attributes of the individuals 
who exhibit the trait. Plausible model-based biases include a predisposition to imitate 
successful or prestigious individuals, and a predisposition to imitate individuals 
similar to oneself. (Boyd and Richerson 2005: 69) 
A model-based bias is the prestige bias:  
Prestige-biased group transmission. Because of our cultural learning abilities, 
individuals will be inclined to preferentially attend to and learn from individuals in 
more successful groups, including those with social norms that lead to greater 
economic success or better health. This causes social norms, including ideas, beliefs, 
practices (e.g., rituals), and motivations, to flow via cultural transmission from more 
successful groups to less successful groups. [endnote 8: See Boyd and Richerson 
2002 and Henrich 2004] Since individuals cannot easily distinguish what makes a 
group more successful, there is a substantial amount of cultural flow that has nothing 
to do with success (e.g., hairstyles and music preferences). (Henrich 2015: 168) 
As it can be seen, the standard evolutionary approach has developed various 
conceptual tools and models for testing many “informal intuitions” of the social 
sciences.34 As I take it, the point for the standard evolutionary approach is to find the 
models that can explain why cultural items are distributed the way they are, but not to 
answer specifically what culture is, 
We don’t think arguing about whether our definition or some other is the “correct” 
definition of culture is worth much effort. Complex natural phenomena such as culture 
are exceedingly difficult to capture with simple definitions, and quarrelling over which 
of the many sensible definitions is best does not seem to us a useful exercise. Rather, 
the question should be, does it generate useful theory? (Boyd and Richerson 2005: 
259, n. 4) 
                                                
34See the list about “a wide range of methodologies [that] are used in the field of cultural 
evolution” in Acerbi and Mesoudi 2105: 482. 
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Despite that “pragmatic” stance, they do have a working definition:  
Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ behavior that they acquire 
from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of 
social transmission. (Boyd and Richerson 2005: 5) 
As it can be seen, the notion of information is central for the standard evolutionary 
approach too, and it does not differ much from the one to be found in the two 
naturalistic approaches I have presented. Cultural items are roughly identified with 
information: 
By information we mean any kind of mental state, conscious or not, that is acquired or 
modified by social learning and affects behavior. We will use everyday words like 
idea, knowledge, belief, value, skill, and attitude to describe this information. (Boyd 
and Richerson 2005: 5) 
“Information” here is intended as a broad term to refer to what social scientists and lay 
people might call knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, norms, preferences, and skills, all of 
which may be acquired from other individuals via social transmission and 
consequently shared across social groups. (Mesoudi 2011: 3) 
This is a mental notion of information very similar to the one in epidemiological and 
memetic accounts,35 which takes almost anything that happens in the brain to be 
information. This implies that culture is in people’s brains: 
Culture is (mostly) information stored in human brains, and gets transmitted from 
brain to brain by way of a variety of social learning processes. (Boyd and Richerson 
2005: 61) 
But, they also consider that artifacts store information. Then, with the invention of 
writing and electronic devices, much cultural information has been stored in artifacts 
external to minds: 
                                                
35Although “representation” is not the notion they commonly use to talk about culture, by 
information in the brain they mean mental representations in the epidemiological sense. See 
Henrich and Boyd 2002, and Henrich et. al 2008.  
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Today an important fraction of culture is stored in written (and electronic, film, etc.) 
form (Donald 1991), and some has probably always been carried in the form of 
artifacts of various kinds. This fact has no doubt substantially affected cultural 
evolution during the last few thousand years. (Boyd and Richerson 2005: 259, n. 5) 
The idea of information stored in brains, in contrast with information stored in artifacts, 
is somehow intuitive. Think about an arrow found by an archeologist. In this case, the 
information contained in an arrow refers to the knowledge that the individuals who 
produced it used in order to make and use it. So, the arrow itself is cultural, but what is 
cultural in it is the information for producing and using it: “a “recipe”—a unit of 
cultural transmission that combines raw materials and the various behaviors that 
constitute a person’s knowledge regarding how a tool is made and used” (Mesoudi and 
O’Brien 2008: 64). 
In addition to not providing a technical notion of information, the standard 
evolutionary account doesn’t have a clear understanding of how information is stored. 
Proponents of this account know it must be stored—brains and artifacts—but not how. 
As Boyd and Richerson emphasize and acknowledge: 
(…) [W]e need some expedient agreement about what to call the information stored in 
people’s brains. This problem is not trivial, because psychologists have deep 
disagreements about the nature of cognition and social learning. Adopting a 
terminology may mean taking sides in these controversies, something that is neither 
necessary nor desirable. But, we can’t go on saying “information stored in people’s 
heads”—it’s just too awkward. (Boyd and Richerson 2005: 63) 
But still there is no clear sign of what they mean by “information,” if not simply some 
stuff that brains or artifacts contain or carry. 
For Boyd and Richerson, the standard evolutionary approach only uses the notion 
of information in order to explain why people behave similarly, without relying on 
reference to their genes (e.g. speak different languages and having different tools). For 
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this to be the case, something must be transmitted non-genetically, it must be 
transmitted socially. 
In a sense, it seems inconceivable that culture is not something that is transmitted. I 
mean, if we see the same object in different periods of time, e.g. arrows, buildings or 
books, this might be an indication that is not only that the particular objects have been 
preserved by those groups. There must be distinct tokens of the same object because 
something remains even if the individuals that have produced such tokens change. That 
is, what reminds us that information is transmitted socially and used to make and to use 
those objects.  
Besides describing culture as information, this account inherits the anthropological 
notion of cultural trait, which is then “reduced” to what is behind the process of 
production and use. So there is no doubt, for the standard evolutionary account cultures 
are collections of beliefs, ideas, values, skills, et cetera. Or in other words, culture is the 
collection of cultural traits, which they characterize as information. Information is not a 
matter of debate in this view.36 Nevertheless, they use different terms, used in slightly 
different ways, to talk about cultural items: cultural variant, cultural packages and 
recipes for action. 
3.4.1. Three terms for cultural items: variants, packages and recipes for action 
The standard evolutionary approach has the notion of cultural trait in its grounds. They 
focus on traits because they are the data that are plugged into their model to test if their 
                                                
36See Lewens 2015 Chapter 3, in which he analyzes the current naturalistic approaches and 
argues that for a “don’t ask” and “don’t tell” posture concerning giving an account of what 
naturalistic approaches mean by information. Since as far as it goes “The notion [information] 
is best understood as an open-ended heuristic prompt which encourages an examination of the 
ways in which bodies of behaviors, skills, beliefs, preferences, and norms are reproduced from 
one generation to the next” (Lewens 2015: 44).  
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models are good enough in explaining the distribution and variation observed in cultural 
phenomena. But as happened in the first half of the twentieth century, what a cultural 
trait is has not been agreed upon yet.37 As I take it, this is why within this view, they use 
three terms to talk about cultural traits.  
 Cultural variants or units 
This term was proposed by Boyd and Richerson. As for most naturalistic approaches, 
cultural items are not discrete units of transmission, and they define variants in 
opposition to memes (Henrich and Boyd 2002). They propose the term “cultural 
variant” in order to refer to the subject matter of culture, to what is transmitted in 
culture: 
Psychologists will one day exchange the terms of folk psychology for clearly defined, 
scientifically reliable concepts; in the meantime we use these terms in the interests of 
producing readable prose. (Boyd and Richerson 2005: 63) 
Cultural variants, then, are just the information we talked about in this section: 
ideas, skills, beliefs, attitudes, and values, and so on, which are not discrete and of 
which we find instances in artifacts.38 
 Cultural packages 
This term is use by Joe Henrich (2009; 2015), he is a collaborator with Boyd and 
Richerson and also talks about variants and representations. What is distinctive about 
Heinrich’s approach is that for for him, culture is constituted by “packages of 
                                                
37For a review on the notion of cultural trait see Lyman and O’Brien 2003, and O’Brien et al. 
2010. 
38While “cultural variant” is a common term for the standard evolutionary approach, let me note 
that when discussing other naturalistic approaches the term “representation” is often used to 
mean the same. Nevertheless, representations are not discussed. 
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information” of “knowing-how” which we use for interacting with our environment. 
One of the examples he uses is the techniques used by hunter gatherers for hunting. This 
is a complex package which involves a precise way to run after prey (that exhausts 
them), bringing water in a container, knowing how to find water, and making and using 
hunting tools. This package is transmitted from generation to generation thanks to the 
biases we have seen, prestige being a key one since the most prestigious hunters are the 
models from which others learn. 
A feature of culture in this view is that these packages of information need not be 
explicit in people’s minds. How to run on the hunt is something hunter-gatherers learn, 
but don’t recall a specific way of doing it or a specific explanation of how to do it. 
“[T]he bearers of these cultural adaptations themselves often don’t understand much of 
how or why they work, beyond the understanding necessary for effectively using them” 
(Henrich 2015: 27).  
 Recipes of action 
Recipes of action as a unit of cultural transmission are analyzed by Lyman and O’Brien 
200339 and it defines cultural traits. This term, in the standard evolutionary approach, is 
similar to the one of meme.  
For this view, a cultural trait is composed of two elements: one is what they call 
“empirical unit” and the other is what they call “ideational unit.”  
An empirical unit is simply an actual token of a cultural item. It is something that 
you can hold in your hands or hear or see with your senses. An ideational unit would be 
the ideas, concepts and knowledge that make it possible for someone to make an 
                                                
39Borrowed from the work of Krause 1985, Schiffer and Skibo 1987 and Neff 1992. 
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empirical unit. The ideational units are meant to be in the brain, but can also be 
extracted from the tokens: reverse engineering. This is an attempt to find a discrete unit 
for culture (similar to the one proposed by memetics).  
For this view, these ideational units constitute the ingredients for what they call 
recipes for action. At first, the notion of recipes for action is meant to explain just 
artifacts, but they argue it can be extended to other cultural items. Ultimately, they 
consider that what is transmitted are recipes of action, by the transmission of the 
ideational units. One of the advantages of describing culture in this way is that the 
ideational units composing a recipe can be found in different recipes, and this is how 
they think that culture can be considered discrete even if on the surface there seem to be 
no clear boundaries between those recipes.  
3.4.2. Summary 
The standard evolutionary approach defines culture as the information that affects 
behavior. This is information that has not been transmitted genetically, but instead by 
social learning, or in other words, cultural information is what we learn from others by 
imitation, teaching or communication. 
The transmission of culture is affected and shaped by our cognitive biases that are 
the product of our biological evolution. The main contribution of the standard 
evolutionary approach to a naturalization of culture has been the development of 
mathematical models that describe such psychological biases which “select” the cultural 
items so that they get transmitted. 
Culture is in the brains of individuals, but also in artifacts. So, when talking about 
the transmission of culture, this means that the information (the cultural item) in one 
individual’s brain ends up in another individual’s brain or encoded in an artifact. 
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Although they use different terms to refer to cultural items, it is not a matter of 
debate that the subject matter of culture are precisely such items. Despite their 
differences in explaining cultural traits they all agree that the cultural trait notion refers 
to ideas, skills, tools, attitudes, norms, songs, and so on, and those are information in 
our brains and in artifacts. 
3.5. Conclusion 
Since E.B. Tylor’s (1871) definition of culture, the social sciences have been struggling 
with this multifarious phenomenon of culture because it involves various classes of 
items that seem difficult to bring together. These are cultural items that range from ideas 
to artifacts: from things that are in people’s minds, to things that are external to their 
minds.  
The naturalistic explanations I have presented here are attempts that aim at 
explaining how such a diversity of items converge in culture in a naturalistic way. That 
is, they give a causal explanation of cultural items in term of things that are in chains of 
transmission, so that they get distributed within human populations. 
In the attempt to answer why cultural items are the way they are, these accounts 
revolve around what seem to be key properties that cultural things have in common: 
being socially transmitted, distributed in a group and stable throughout the process. 
Those seem to be the defining properties of the cultural. Or in other words, what makes 
the items cultural. Moreover, they identify culture with whatever fits these properties to 
a point that, for the epidemiological, memetic and standard evolutionary approaches “to 
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explain culture is to answer the following question: why are some representations more 
successful in a human population, more ‘catching’ than others?” (Sperber 1996: 85). 
It seems clear that, no matter which naturalistic approach one takes, culture is 
“reduced” to a single kind of item: representations, mental or public; memes that are in 
people’s brains and artifacts; or that are made out of traits that have empirical and 
ideational units, all of which contain cultural information. Thus, for the naturalistic 
accounts items are the subject matter of culture.  
This is why I group these approaches to culture under the label of the Itemic View 
of Culture (IVC, for short). IVC does a sort of “reification” of the cultural subject 
matter. Thus the notion of IVC classifies any approach to culture that assumes that 
culture is the collection of items that are in people’s brains and environment; items that 
are transmitted among the individuals of a population by non-genetic means, so that 
they get shared by individuals over time. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, constraints are necessary for information to flow, and 
attunement to constraints is necessary for an organism to be able to exploit such 
information. Thus, constraints must be key in explaining the subject matter of culture. 
They offer us what is missing in the IVC. In Chapter 4, I present the picture offered by a 
constraint-based approach, and then in Chapter 5, I will go through the differences 
between these two approaches. 
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4. What is culture about: the 
constraint-based approach 
Constraints as the subject matter of culture 
However, if the micro-processes are 
fundamentally misunderstood, as I believe 
they have been in previous epidemiological 
approaches, the overall picture is of limited 
value.  
Sperber 1996: 50 
In this chapter, I show that the fundamental subject matter of culture is constituted by 
what I call “cultural constraints,” that is to say, conventional constraints to which a set 
of people are not genetically attuned. In a few words, it is the attunement of some 
individuals (more than one) to a conventional constraint that makes the constraint 
cultural, and also makes the set of individuals a cultural set. This is culture at its most 
fundamental level. I also show how more complex forms of culture arise out of this 
fundamental level. First, let me tell a story. 
4.1. Yolanda’s mornings 
4.1.1. The story 
Yolanda is new in town. She came to Donostia from Balazote, a village in Albacete, for 
a job as a researcher. She has already met her new co-workers. They seem quite nice. 
She will share an office with them. On her first regular working day, she arrives a bit 
late. She is shy and she is also a little nervous. She utters: “¡Buenos días!”. Nobody 
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answers. She thinks they probably didn’t hear her. She’ll have to utter it louder next 
time. 
And she does. On day 2, she utters “¡Buenos días!” to make sure they hear her this 
time. Same result. Nobody answers back. “What’s wrong with these guys? How can 
they be so rude? Or perhaps, it’s me. Perhaps they don’t like me,” she thinks. Then 
Aida, the co-worker from Ribadeo (Asturias) arrives and utters “¡Buenos días!” with no 
answer either, not even from Yolanda. “So, it’s not me,” she thinks. Perhaps it’s the 
language. She remembers someone had told her that, given the linguistic and cultural 
diversity of the members of the Institute, the working language at ILCLI was English. 
So on day 3, she tries uttering “Good morning!” but the result is the same as before. 
Perhaps it has something to do with the Spanish language. She has heard stories 
about language conflicts in Catalunya. Reportedly, Catalan people don’t like Spanish 
speakers. If you address them in Spanish, either they’ll answer in Catalan or give you no 
answer at all. “Perhaps, something similar is going on in the Basque Country,” thinks 
Yolanda. So, she searches her dictionary and on day 4 she tries “Egun on!”. No answer. 
So, after much hesitation, she reprimands the guys: “What’s wrong with you? Why 
don’t you reply when someone comes in and says ‘good morning’?” They look at her 
startled. “What do you mean, we don’t reply?” says Josu, “We always answer, don’t 
we?”. Zvonko and Igor nod: “Yes, we do.”  
On day 5, Yolanda says “¡Buenos días!”. They all answer “¡Buenos días!”. When 
Aida arrives, and says “¡Buenos días!”, they all answer “¡Buenos días!”, including 
Yolanda.  
On day 6, Yolanda says “Egun on!”. They all answer “Egun on!”. When Aida 
arrives, and says “¡Buenos días!”, they all answer “¡Buenos días!”, including Yolanda. 
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On day 7, Yolanda says “Egun on!”, but there is no understandable answer. Josu 
has produced some unrecognizable sound; something like a grunt. Igor and Zvonko 
produce no sound. When Aida arrives and says “¡Buenos días!” there is no grunt even. 
But Yolanda observes that they make a little upward movement of their heads. 
On day 8, Yolanda says “Good morning!”. No sound at all. She notices, however, 
that head movements were accompanied by small raisings of eyebrows. When Aida 
arrives, and says “¡Buenos días!”, she guesses that the head movement and eyebrow 
raising are systematic. 
From day 8 on, she’s quite certain that that’s the way Igor, Josu and Zvonko 
respond to a greeting in the office. Whomever the greeter is, whatever language the 
greeter is using, they lightly raise their heads and eyebrows with or without producing 
an accompanying inarticulate sound. 
4.1.2. The account  
Our constraint-based account offers a natural explanation of what’s going on with 
Yolanda’s mornings. She’s attuned to the following cultural constraint: 
C1: If x greets y, then y greets x back. 
She never thought much about it. It might well be that she is not aware of the constraint 
and of her attunement to it. Until coming to Donostia and meet Igor, Josu, and Zvonko 
it always worked. That means that the people she has met so far in Albacete, in Galicia 
and other places were attuned to C1, or perhaps, more specifically, to 
C2: If x says “¡Buenos días!” to y, then y says “¡Buenos días!” to x. 
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C1 and C2 are conventional constraints. They are not transmitted genetically, but 
“culturally.”40 And they are violable. As Yolanda has learnt by experience, people may 
choose not to respond to a greeting. Even she has so chosen in the past. But very rarely. 
In her experience, the constraint worked most of the time. And, again, since it worked, 
neither she nor her fellow citizens needed to be aware of the constraint and their 
attunement to it: “[c]hildren use words to convey information about their wants and 
needs long before they are conscious of words as words” (Barwise and Perry 1999 
[1983]: 18). 
Following our distinction between modes of attunement made in Chapter 2, we can 
say that Yolanda’s unaware attunement to a constraint is a case of simple attunement or 
s-attunement. We can say now, that before the events in Yolanda’s Donostia mornings, 
Yolanda was s-attuned to C1 and C2, as were her fellow citizens of Albacete and 
Galicia.41 Notice that, for a person to be s-attuned to a constraint, she needs no explicit 
representation of the constraint. As she never gave a thought to it, she does not even 
distinguish between C1, C2, or any other greeting constraint. No mental representation is 
presumed for s-attunement; just the capacity to recognize or identify a situation as a 
greeting situation and act accordingly, by greeting back. 
Yolanda’s simple attunement to C1 and C2 changed on day 1 in the story, when she 
got no reply to her utterance of “¡Buenos días!” For one thing, she became aware that 
she was attuned to some greeting constraint; a constraint that, for some reason, seemed 
not to work that day. She might not have an explicit representation of what her greeting 
                                                
40 As we will see in Chapter 5, “transmitted” may not be the right term here. The itemic view 
requires it, but our approach offers an alternative account of how the cultural subject matter 
gets shared in a group.  
41 I will shortly distinguish between various modes of sharing attunement to a certain constraint, 
at the plural, social or cultural level. 
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constraint is, but she is aware that she is attuned to a certain constraint; the same 
constraint that her fellow Albaceteans and Galicians are s-attuned to. So Yolanda is now 
aware attuned or aw-attuned to C1 and C2. Aw-attunement does not require Yolanda to 
have an explicit mental representation of C1 or C2. It just requires her s-attunement to 
the constraint plus her awareness of it. She will be fully consciously attuned or fc-
attuned to C1 and C2 when she is aw-attuned to the constraint and gets an explicit (and 
accurate) representation of them. 
On day 2, Yolanda is aw-attuned to C1 and C2 but she is not fc-attuned yet. She did 
not think again about the particular constraint she was attuned to, and at the time she 
thinks that, as far as she knows, the Basque guys might be attuned to the very same 
constraint. The problem might be a problem of perception. They just didn’t hear her 
utterance. So, she tries a louder greeting. When that doesn’t work, she starts considering 
other possibilities. She thinks about the constraints she is attuned to, and she explicitly 
thinks about C1 and C2 as 
C1: If x greets y, then y greets x back. 
C2: If x says “¡Buenos días!” to y, then y says “¡Buenos días!” to x. 
Yes. She is fc-attuned to C1 and C2. She thinks that Igor, Josu and Zvonko might be 
attuned to C1 and C2. It might be just that they violate the constraint because of her. It is 
a conventional constraint, so it can be violated. Or maybe, being a conditional 
constraint, they have the condition that C1 and C2 hold unless x is identical with 
Yolanda. This hypothesis is rejected when they react exactly the same with Aida’s 
greeting. Then Yolanda thinks about the language. She thinks they may be attuned to C1 
but not to C2. After trying C3 and C4 on days 3 and 4, she rejects these hypotheses too. 
C3: If x says “Good morning!” to y, then y says “Good morning!” to x. 
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C4: If x says “Egun on!” to y, then y says “Egun on!” to x. 
She is starting to lose hope with these people, and to think that they are not even 
attuned to C1. And that’s when she reprimands them. But they are surprised. As far as 
she could tell, after challenging them, they are attuned to C1 and C2. Now, how do we 
explain their answer, assuming they are being sincere? 
We have again a natural account of the events. After Yolanda’s reprimand, they 
explicitly represented the constraints C1 and C2. So, we can say that they know the 
constraints, they accept them, and they believe they are attuned them. If they were 
attuned to them, they would be fc-attuned to them. But they are not fc-attuned; not even 
aw-attuned or s-attuned. Knowing a constraint does not involve being attuned to it, as 
being attuned to a constraint doesn’t imply knowing (having an explicit accurate 
representation of) it.  
Igor, Josu and Zvonko know the constraints C1 and C2.; they have an explicit 
representation of them and they can act upon them. They can exploit them. On day 5 
and 6 they do it. They use their mental representation of C1 and C2 and respond 
accordingly to Yolanda’s and Aida’s greetings either in Basque or Spanish. But it didn’t 
last. Two days acting according to the constraint they know was not enough to get them 
s-attuned to C1 and C2. Whatever Igor, Josu and Zvonko think about the greeting 
constraints they are attuned to, Yolanda has noticed that there is another constraint 
holding in the office among the five researchers: 
C5: If x says “¡Buenos días!/Good morning!/Egun on!” to y, then y raises their head and 
eyebrows to x. 
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And that C5 always holds only when x belongs to the set {Aida, Yolanda} and y belongs 
to {Igor, Josu, Zvonko}. She likes C2 in whatever language better than C5, but she is 
afraid it might evolve into 
C6: If x raises their head and eyebrows to y, then y raises their head and eyebrows to x, 
with x and y ranging over the whole set of researchers in room C8 of the institute. Still 
that would be better than abandoning any attunement to C1 altogether. 
4.2. Cultural constraints 
I am now in a position to state in more precise terms what I take to be the fundamental 
notions of culture. Remember that the standard naturalistic approach to culture defines it 
as “widely distributed, long-lasting representations” (Sperber 1996: 57), representations 
“that are widespread and enduring in a social group” (Sperber 1996: 25). Our first and 
most important difference with that view concerns the subject matter of culture. In our 
view, it is not representations, but constraints; and not any kind of constraints, but just 
conventional constraints; and not any conventional constraints, but those to which more 
than one individual is attuned.  
Our notion of attunement involves systematicity, that is, the notion of persistence in 
time of the cultural subject matter. There is no attunement without regularity or 
systematicity, and that means time. 
On the other hand, our notion of sharedness (distributed, common and fully shared 
attunement) captures the notion of distribution of cultural content and its spread within 
a society, as well as for the various notions of cultural group in place. In its basic sense, 
a cultural group is nothing but a set of people defined by its members’ individual s-
  79 
attunement to a conventional constraint. That makes the constraint cultural and the 
group (i.e. the set) cultural as well. There is no need of any other glue to make a group 
out the set of individuals. The individuals may have come out perfectly with their 
attunement to the same constraint entirely individually, without any sort of transmission 
(imitation, communication or whatever) among them. This can be true of any sort of 
mental or public representation they share. We can talk of micro-, meso- and macro-
cultures and cultural groups. We can talk of more or less ephemeral or long-lasting 
cultures. But we do not need to find or postulate any chain of representations at work 
within the group. Culture in its basic form is a matter of distributed s-attunement of a 
plurality of people to a constraint. 
I do not mean to say that representations and their transmission do not play a role in 
the explanation of cultural phenomena. My claim is rather that it is insufficient to 
explain culture in its more basic forms; the forms that make representations and their 
transmission possible. 
The notion of common aw-attunement captures a stronger sense of a cultural group: 
the sense in which individuals are aware that they are attuned to a constraint. In this 
sense, individuals are aware that they belong to a cultural group with members that are 
also aware that they belong to the group. But still at this level, the population that is 
commonly aw-attuned to the constraint need not share any explicit representation of it. 
When they have it, we are talking about fc-attuned people that fully share the constraint.  
These distinctions serve to capture quite naturally how culture works in its most 
fundamental forms. Let’s illustrate this with a fictional example.  
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4.2.1. Z-lang. The language of Z-landers 
Z-land is a remote island in the Pacific.42 Z-landers have never had any contact with any 
non-Z-lander, and their language, Z-lang, though simple in some respects—for instance, 
they lack a word for the English indexical “here”—serves their basic communicative 
needs. All adult Z-landers are fluent speakers of Z-lang and their children acquire it 
naturally. From our point of view, Z-lang is just a set of conventional constraints as 
with any language, and Z-landers are distributively s-attuned to them, which together 
make the constraints cultural. For Z-landers, Z-lang is as natural as rain in Z-land. They 
do not distinguish raining in Z-land from raining in some other place because they are 
not aware of any other place but Z-land. When they speak, they don’t distinguish 
between speaking Z-lang and speaking some other language, because they are not aware 
of any other language. Everything works fine, so they need not be aware of any of the 
Z-lang constraints they are attuned to. That’s what we mean when we say that they are 
individually s-attuned to Z-lang and that the s-attunement is distributed among non-
infant Z-landers. 
One day a pair of Basque Jesuit missionaries arrived on the shores of Z-land 
causing some surprise and confusion to the few Z-landers who first met them, a small 
group of fisherwomen. After overcoming their initial shock at the missionaries’ skin 
color, their dark costumes and lack of hygiene, the Z-landers spoke to them. And there 
came another surprise, the newcomers couldn’t speak. They did produce some sounds, 
not very different from the sounds produced by some animals in Z-land, but it wasn’t 
language. Were they humans? Were they dangerous? They left the strangers there and 
went into town to discuss the matter with their fellow Z-landers. 
                                                
42 Of course, the example is inspired by Perry’s (1986) Z-land. 
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After some deliberation, they agreed on a couple of issues. They, the Z-landers, 
spoke a language, Z-lang—that they named “the language,” a new word in Z-lang—and 
the strangers didn’t speak it. They were not sure whether the strangers couldn’t speak at 
all or didn’t speak Z-lang but something else. They needed to do more research to 
decide that. They invented the Z-word “Barbarian” to name the (non)-language the 
strangers might (or might not) speak and also the newcomers themselves. We can say 
that it is at this stage when Z-landers passed from mere distributed s-attunement to Z-
lang to common aw-attunement to it. Notice that they did not need, and did not have, an 
explicit representation of the constraints constituting Z-lang. They just spoke it and now 
they were aware that they spoke it and some other people didn’t. But they didn’t know 
what speaking it exactly consisted in. They didn’t have the slightest idea about how to 
represent that. 
Time and constant contact with the missionaries brought some further changes. The 
missionaries were amateur grammarians and with their help, a small group of Z-landers, 
named “The Academy of Z-lang” started to describe their language, to make explicit the 
constraints of Z-lang. Supposing that their descriptions were accurate, we can say that 
the members of the Academy of Z-lang became fc-attuned to their language and fully 
shared it. As it happened, given their contribution to the grammar of Z-lang, the 
Barbarians were named members of the Academy. In fact, they got to know the 
grammar of Z-lang better than any other member of the Academy, even if they never 
became fluent enough to participate naturally in an ordinary Z-lang conversation. This 
points to an important distinction that it is worth emphasizing once again: the 
distinction between being attuned to and knowing a constraint. 
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4.2.2. To share a cultural constraint 
We have illustrated the application of the distinction between s-, aw-, and fc-
attunements of an individual to a constraint in a particular case. We’ll now elaborate on 
those distinctions looking at the various ways of “sharing” the constraints within a 
plurality of people. 
Naturalistic approaches to culture, as we have seen in Chapter 3, take sharing the 
subject matter of culture as central to the explanation. To share among a significant 
number of people and for a significant amount of time a representation or a meme (that 
is, an information package of some sort) is what culture consists in, given that 
information is transmitted by non-genetic means. I agree with the general picture, but I 
would amend its details in two important respects. 
First, culture, in its most fundamental form, needs no mental representation of its 
content in the mind-brain of the people involved. And second, to share a culture, in this 
fundamental sense, there is no need of transmission by imitation, copying or 
communication between people of a group. 
Both aspects may also be illustrated by our previous example. Before her arrival to 
Donostia, Yolanda was not aware of her attunement to C1 and C2. And neither were the 
Albaceteans and Galicians, in the circumstances we imagined. They were all 
individually s-attuned. Thus, C1 and C2 defines a set of people via their s-attunement to 
the constraints, without the constraints being represented in any way in a person’s mind. 
I will call this situation, a case in which the individuals of a set are s-attuned to a 
constraint, distributed s-attunement. In a sense, distributed s-attunement of a constraint 
is a way to share the constraint and the attunement to it. But the attunement is an 
individual relation to the constraint that happens to be the same constraint for a plurality 
  83 
of individuals. In the case of natural constraints this is mandated by their biological 
architecture and the individuals’ environment; in the case of conventional constraints, it 
is not. Does this kind of sharing of an attunement require any sort of transmission? 
Well, it’s difficult to know how these particular constraints arose in the first place, and 
that’s an empirical issue anyway. I contend, in any case, that transmission is not 
conceptually required in order for the cultural constraint to arise. But I’ll leave the issue 
of the birth, life, and death of a cultural constraint for the next section to focus now on 
the different ways of sharing a constraint. 
A set of people can share a constraint in a way that goes beyond distributed s-
attunement. As we have seen, Yolanda became aware that she shared some greeting 
constraint with Albaceteans and Galicians but possibly not with Basques, when she 
arrived in Donostia and noticed that, whatever the constraint, it seemed not to work in 
her new environment. We can imagine that other people who were also attuned to C1 
and C2 had similar experiences; so we have a set of people, including Yolanda, who are 
aware of their attunement to some constraint. I’ll talk in this case of common 
attunement. These individuals are individually aw-attuned and commonly attuned to C1 
and C2, even if they need not have an explicit representation of C1 and C2. When 
Yolanda eventually got an explicit representation of C1 and C2, she became fc-attuned to 
them. Again, we can think that other people in the set of Albaceteans and Galicians 
commonly aw-attuned also made explicit representations of C1 and C2 and became fc-
attuned. We’ll say that people are individually fc-attuned to the constraints or that fully 
shared them. 
Hence, within the set of people that share a certain constraint we can distinguish at 
least two other sets. First, of course, there is the set of all Albaceteans and Galicians 
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who are distributively s-attuned to C1 and C2. Let’s suppose that it includes all 
Albaceteans and Galicians. This set includes however a second subset, those who are 
aw-attuned commonly. And this includes a third subset of people who are fc-attuned, so 
they fully share the constraint. 
If we are right and the itemic view requires an explicit representation to be shared, 
then, the only cultural group considered here as such would be the third one. Just the 
case in which people share an explicit representation of the constraint, would count as 
cultural. And the cultural group would only be the third one; the set of people who are, 
in our terminology, fc-attuned to C1 and C2. The constraint-based approach, however, 
explains how this set comes into existence as a cultural group, starting from the basic 
and distributed s-attunement. 
4.3. Being attuned to versus knowing a constraint 
As we just saw, a certain individual can have explicit knowledge of a constraint without 
being attuned to it in any sense (neither fc-attuned, aw-attuned, nor s-attuned), and she 
can act upon her explicit knowledge. In the other direction, an individual can be s-
attuned or even aw-attuned to a constraint and not know the constraint she exploits. If 
she is fc-attuned, on the other hand, then she knows the constraint. In other words, fc-
attunement and knowledge involve an explicit representation of the constraint. Having 
an explicit accurate representation of a constraint is both a necessary and a sufficient 
condition for knowledge of it. Having an explicit representation of a constraint is 
necessary for fc-attunement, but it is not sufficient.  
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Using our previous example, we can say that the following statements are true 
about any Z-lander z, previous to the arrival of the missionaries: 
a. z is s-attuned to Z-lang 
b. z does not know Z-lang 
After the arrival of the missionaries, but before the elaboration of the grammar, we have 
that: 
a’ (=a). z is s-attuned to Z-lang 
b’. z is aware that she is s-attuned to Z-lang, i.e. z is aw-attuned to Z-lang 
c’. z is aware that all z’s are aw-attuned to Z-lang, i.e. z is commonly attuned to Z-
lang 
d’ (=b).  z does not know Z-lang 
Notice that b’ could naturally be rephrased as “z knows that she is s-attuned to Z-lang”; 
c’ can be rewritten as “it is common knowledge among z’s that they are aw-attuned to 
Z-lang.” To avoid confusion, however, I’ll stick to my terminology, and keep the verb 
“to know” for the case of explicit (i.e. represented) knowledge of a constraint or a set of 
constraints. In my terminology, s-attunement and aw-attunement are insufficient for 
knowledge. Only fc-attunement involves knowledge of a constraint. So, in my use of 
the terms, native speakers of a language who are aw-attuned but not fc-attuned to their 
language do not know their language. This is the case of speakers who are illiterate, that 
is to say, they are not formally educated in their own language. They just do not know 
any explicit representations of the linguistic constraints they are s- or aw-attuned to. 
Some linguists and philosophers would talk about implicit knowledge in this case. As 
long as the emphasis is on implicit, and knowledge does not require the assumption of 
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an articulated representation in their mind/brains, the difference would be merely 
terminological.43 
When the Academy of Z-lang finishes its grammar, the constraints are made 
explicit. If we assume that they were accurately described, then, the following is true 
about the z’s who are members of the Academy: 
 
a” (=a=a’). just as before and then 
b”. z is fully conscious that she is aw-attuned to Z-lang, i.e z is fc-attuned to Z-
lang 
c’’. z is fully conscious that all z’s in the Academy are fc-attuned to Z-lang. i.e. z 
shares Z-lang with all z’s members of the Academy 
d”. z knows Z-lang 
So the Z-lander members of the Academy not only speak their language, but they have 
an explicit representation of their language, and, only then know their language in my 
sense.  
Now, even if the grammar of Z-lang is descriptively perfect, and the two 
missionaries, through their close collaboration, ended up with a nearly perfect 
knowledge of the constraints that Z-lang speakers are attuned to, and we can say in this 
                                                
43 Another caveat might be required here. My concept of “language” here corresponds to what 
generativists call “external” or “E-language” (Chomsky 1986). I take Z-lang to be an E-
language, and it is in this sense that I claim it is a set of cultural constraints. The notion of 
grammar also corresponds to an E-grammar. As far as I can tell, this is compatible with the 
concept of (a universal) I-grammar or language acquisition device; a device, which, from my 
perspective would amount to a set of natural constraints, which I-linguists try to make explicit. 
Humans would come biologically equipped with such a device that allow them (during certain 
years) to get attuned to any E-language in their environment. But, obviously, these issues go 
beyond the limits of the present work.  
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sense that they know Z-lang, it is perfectly possible that they are not themselves 
speakers of the language because they are not attuned to the constraints.44  
But suppose now that the grammar written by the Academy of Z-lang is not entirely 
correct, that, driven by the missionaries’ preference for analogy over anomaly, they 
misdescribed the constraints and treated, say, verb-tenses as if they were regular when 
they were in fact irregular. We would have in this case two sets of constraints, the ones 
belonging to Z-lang, the language actually spoken by Z-landers, and some other 
constraints belonging to a language that nobody speaks, call it X-lang. Nobody speaks 
X-lang, but some people know it, the members of the Academy of Z-lang. Z-lang is 
spoken by Z-landers, but nobody is attuned to X-lang.45 
Perhaps the Academy built schools for educating children and adults by learning 
the grammar of Z-lang, which was actually the grammar of X-lang. By learning the 
grammar, they gradually changed some of the constraints they were attuned to, such that 
finally they ended up talking something in between X- and Z-lang; Y-lang, for example. 
I am convinced that something similar has happened and still happens in the history of 
many languages.46 Explicit cultural constraints may not only describe accurately or not 
                                                
44 I am not saying that this is the usual case, but just that it is possible, and that illustrates a clear 
case in which attunement to, or implicit knowledge of, linguistic constraints, on the one hand, 
and explicit knowledge of them, on the other, come apart. Incidentally, this is quite a common 
phenomenon in the Basque Country, where some people learn Basque just to obtain a 
certificate. They may succeed in the exam that “proves” that they know Basque, but they are 
not attuned to the constraints of Basque and thus are unable to maintain a natural conversation. 
The cases of the missionaries who produced the grammars of Tarascan (Mexico, 1558), 
Quechua (Peru, 1560), Nahuatl (Mexico, 1571) and Guarani (Brasil, 1640) (Lepschy 1998) 
might not have been very different from our Basque missionaries in Z-land. We may not 
ordinarily put it like that, but, in my terminology, they could have been people who know the 
language but they’re not attuned to it. They are formally educated in a language they don’t 
speak. That’s how I often feel about my knowledge/attunement of English. 
45 Thus, X-lang constraints are something like embryonic or potential constraints and not 
cultural or conventional constraints in a strict sense, insofar as no one is attuned to them. 
46 It is not an accident that the “unification” of many languages happened together with the 
creation of a state that officially adopted that language with an Academy to promote it. The 
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the actual constraints that people are attuned to, but also alter those constraints. Our 
attunement to cultural constraints starts, evolves and eventually dies, which means that 
the constraints themselves start, evolve and die with them. That’s the topic of the next 
section. 
4.4. Birth, life and death of a cultural constraint 
4.4.1. Birth 
Natural constraints are out there; they constitute the way the natural world works. They 
are independent of the humans that populate it. Of course, it is the attunement to these 
constraints that allows humans to survive in that world. But natural constraints would 
still be out there without the attunement of any human.  
Conventional constraints and, in particular, cultural constraints, however, would not 
be there without the attunement of any human to them. They are the result of humans’ 
attunement to them. But how does that occur in the first place?  
In my view, cultural constraints (conceptually) come from conventional constraints; 
they are conventional constraints meeting some conditions on distributed attunement in 
a population. But what are conventional constraints? What is a convention? My view 
here is a bit different from the view adopted by Situation Theory, and, more generally, 
from the views after Lewis’ seminal works on conventions (Lewis 2002 [1969])47 
Barwise makes explicit that in their picture a conventional constraint involves a 
                                                                                                                                          
cases of Italian and Spanish in the fifteenth century and French, English and Polish in the 
sixteenth, are good examples. See Lepschy 1998 for the history of linguistics in that period. 
47 See for example Gilbert 1983, Millikan 1998, Stotts 2016. 
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population of agents and some notion of mutual knowledge (or mutual belief) for those 
agents. 
A very important property of conventional constraints R is that they must be mutual, 
or shared (Lewis [125]). [Footnote 6: See Chapter 9 below for a discussion of mutual 
knowledge] They must mutually bind all the parties to the convention in order to be 
successful communication channels between agents. Consider a case of two agents, 
say A and B, who share a convention R used to communicate information. In order for 
this to work, it is necessary that both parties know of the convention R, of course, but 
more is necessary. This knowledge of R must be mutual knowledge. That is (following 
Clark and Marshall (1981)), there needs to be a real situation s such that (i) both A and 
B know the facts of s, (ii) among these facts is the constraint R, but (iii) also among 
the facts of s are the facts that A knows the facts of s and that B knows the facts of s. 
From this assumption, it typically follows that A knows that B knows of R, B knows 
that A knows of R, and so forth. [Footnote 7: This property of conventional constraints 
was missed in S&A, in two senses. First, we did not fully realize its importance. 
Second, the formal set-theoretic machinery used in S&A does not allow the modeling 
of such circular situations. For more on this, see Barwise and Perry (1985), Barwise 
(1986), (1985).] The consequences are needed to see how agents can use such 
conventions to affect others in the way they intend. (Barwise 1989: 69) 
Conventional constraints, then, should include mutual knowledge of them, according to 
Barwise. In my view, however, there is conceptual room for an individual conventional 
constraint, as we have seen in Chapter 2. A convention that is the convention of a single 
individual is, if not typical, at least conceptually possible. I contend that it is even 
plausible that that’s how many of our cultural constraints are born: as practices, 
customs, or procedures adopted by a single individual to perform quite individualistic 
regular acts that need not involve the mutual, common or shared belief with any other 
individual. After Lewis, conventions have been understood as ways of resolving 
coordination issues among various agents. But I think that conventions can and do arise 
from coordination problems in purely individual planning and action. 
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I have some options to go from home to work: I can walk, ride my bike, go by bus, 
or by taxi. In fact, I realize that I never considered this last option (they are too 
expensive for my budget), and other options are excluded (I don’t know how to drive a 
car). But the thing is that I do not consider all these options every morning. Adopting a 
habit is just a way of stopping thinking about these different options and taking 
decisions every day. I just don’t think about it, and ride my bike every morning. When I 
take my bike, I don’t think about the best route to campus either. Perhaps, I never 
considered the various options. I just did it some way one day, and then repeated it with 
small variations. From my perspective, acquiring a habit is just an example of getting 
attuned to a convention, establishing a systematic relation between types of situations; 
and by that attunement, creating the convention itself: a convention that is entirely 
personal, a convention that does not involve mutual knowledge of any kind. Think 
about the habits adopted by the first driver of the first car in Donostia. When she 
acquired some habits about the itinerary from home to work, they were personal, and 
not social in any sense. One can have a conventional route that is entirely personal, that 
isn’t copied from anyone else, and that nobody imitates.48  
Humans are creatures of habit. We adopt habits for the most simple or idiosyncratic 
reasons. I put the knives in the washer in a particular way (“pointing upwards”), I 
always follow the same itinerary from home to work (along the Boulevard, and 
Ondarreta) and back. I chain my bike in the same way (resting the bike against a post on 
the side where I cannot damage the lock bracket and then put the chain through the 
bike’s frame) … No doubt, some of these habits I took from others without considering 
their reasons, for some others, I considered the reasons (putting the knives point up is 
                                                
48 That does not mean that the conventions one adopts are arbitrary. The agent might have 
reasons having to do with their environment or their natural capacities or tendencies. My point 
is just that they can (though need not) start in a purely individual way. 
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good for the knife blades–Gregory’s reason—but not for the integrity of the agent’s 
hands—my mom’s reason to put them downwards). And in those cases, the 
conventional constraints would not be merely individual, but cultural. But other things 
start with no clear reason and no obvious copying or imitation, perhaps in purely 
idiosyncratic ways. 
In my view, then, all conventional constraints are potentially cultural. If there is 
more than one single individual attuned to the conventional constraint, it will become 
cultural.49 
4.4.2. Evolution 
One day in the bar Rekalde, I asked the waiter for a favor. I asked whether they could 
add a fried sausage to my order of a mixto serrano-vegetal sandwich. He discussed it 
with the cook, and they agreed that they would do that for me. And it was excellent. I 
didn’t have a favorite until then and I had eaten most of the sandwiches on their menu. 
But since then, whenever I felt like eating a sandwich at the Rekalde, I would order a 
mixto serrano-vegetal “with a…” and they would understand and add a sausage to it. 
We can say that, initially I was the only person attuned to the constraint  
C1: If you happen to feel like eating a sandwich at the Rekalde, order a mixto 
serrano-vegetal “with a…” 
Gradually, I probably dropped the “with a…” and we can say that the waiters of the 
Rekalde and I got attuned to the following constraint: 
                                                
49 Paraphrasing Carroll, I would say that my point in introducing the concept of an individual 
convention here is “to block the facile identification of the cultural and the conventional” 
(Carroll 2004 [1985]: 489). In the context of a discussion about movies, he talks of plows as a 
cultural invention rather a convention. From my point of view, the “invention” of the plow 
could have been the product of an ingenious individual’s conventional constraint, that, when 
adopted by her fellows became a cultural constraint. 
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C2: If Josu orders a mixto serrano-vegetal, that means a mixto serrano-vegetal 
with a sausage. 
Other customers observed my exchange with the waiters and asked me about the 
sandwich. They started ordering themselves “a mixto serrano-vegetal with a sausage,” 
“a mixto serrano-vegetal with a…,” or “a mixto serrano-vegetal like Polu’s.” Anyhow, 
the owners of Rekalde realized that more people have adopted their own version of C1 
and C2. So, “mixto serrano-vegetal” started to be ambiguous. It either meant what it 
initially meant or had my idiosyncratic and now more popular meaning. The cook of the 
Rekalde decided to name the second meaning after me. That’s how the Polu sandwich 
got onto the Rekalde’s menu. “Polu” is one of my nicknames, by the way. It’s not clear 
whether this should count as the birth of a new constraint, which ends up being explicit 
in the menu of the Rekalde, or it’s better understood as an existing constraint that 
evolves into another. There might be no fact of the matter in cases like this. 
Take again the case of Z-lang. Of course, in this case even the first of the 
constraints may be taken to be essentially social. We can assume that languages arise 
for communication and, thus, social purposes. So, the conventional constraints that 
constitute a language have a social and, hence, cultural character from the very 
beginning.50 The constraints change, evolve, get more complex, sometimes simpler by 
the interaction of many factors. This is not the place to deal with such difficult issues. 
Suffice it to say that one of the factors is the explicitation of the constraints, which 
elevates, so to speak, a constraint from mere distributed s-attunement in a social group, 
to shared fc-attunement. As we saw, the explicitation of constraints in a grammar can 
shape the actual constraints the people are attuned to. 
                                                
50 Remember that I am talking about E-language here, and not about our linguistic biological 
endowment or I-language. 
  93 
Another case of evolution of constraints can be illustrated by an important and more 
realistic social and cultural matter than Z-lang. I’m thinking about sexism. Here is how 
the problem of sexism can be sketchily understood from the constraint-based approach 
to culture. 
We can say that, as we are becoming conscious of gender inequality and 
discrimination, we are slowly becoming aware of how sexism is present in our behavior. 
Sexism, however, is not a recent phenomenon. Our sexist behaviors have very old roots. 
Previous generations were probably more sexist than we are. But they didn’t know they 
were. I would say that most men and women were distributively s-attuned to many 
constraints that were, in fact, sexist (that is, they represented, caused or promoted 
gender inequality), without practically anyone being aware of the constraints they were 
attuned to. At a further stage, some people (the early feminists) became aw-attuned to 
the constraints and commonly so. That is, they became aware that there were constraints 
that practically all the members of their societies, including the feminists themselves, 
were attuned to. They didn’t know what those constraints explicitly were, but only their 
pervasiveness and their pernicious results: women were excluded from the labor market, 
they were confined to unrecognized “housekeeping,” they were excluded from suffrage, 
they were subject to systematic sexual abuse … and a long et cetera.  
Our early feminists had a tough job. Ending sexism required action at two different 
levels, at least: 
- They had to promote aw-attunement to be more commonly shared in their 
societies. People need to be aware that it is their attunement to some 
constraints that make them act in certain ways, which is at the root of 
sexism. 
- They had to make the relevant constraints explicit, i.e. become fc-attuned to 
those constraints, in order to be able to change and eventually substitute 
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them for alternative constraints that promote equality and end up killing the 
sexist constraints. 
Being fc-attuned to the constraints and recognizing them as sexist is an important 
step, but it may well not be sufficient for ending up with one’s attunement to that 
constraint. You can decide to stop being attuned to some particular sexist constraint, but 
it is not easy. Think about these two constraints: 
C1: If you think/talk about an indeterminate nurse, you think/talk of a woman 
C2: If you think/talk about an indeterminate doctor, you think/talk of a man 
For a long time, you, like me, might have been attuned to these constraints without 
being aware of them. When the feminists’ work made them explicit you were made fc-
attuned to them, and you were conscious that you shared your attunement with many, if 
not most, people in your society. It is true, from childhood, that you encountered more 
male doctors than female (perhaps all?); more female nurses than male (perhaps all?). 
But that’s not true anymore. Again, due to the tremendous job of early feminists, the 
sexist distribution of professional roles is weaker now in education and training. 
Women gain access to university studies in every sector, and there are more women 
doctors than men in my primary care center, although the nurses are still mostly women. 
But I have to admit, I’m still attuned to C1 and C2. In a nutshell, I am a feminist but I’m 
still sexist; that is, I’m not a feminist. 
That sounds like a blatant contradiction, but actually it is not. And the constraint-
based approach can explain why. I can rightfully consider myself a feminist when, 
being fc-attuned to the explicit constraints like C1 and C2 that I recognize as sexist, I 
decide to fight my and everyone else’s attunement to them; the ones that are explicit and 
those sexist constraints that are not explicit yet. In that respect, I am a feminist. On the 
other hand, my attunement to C1 and C2 is still there. I cannot help being attuned to 
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them. Yolanda tells me, “I went to the doctor,” I ask, “Was he nice?” “Actually, I saw 
the nurse,” says Yolanda; I ask, “Was she nice?” Another example that illustrates how 
difficult it is to avoid attunement is provided by language: one cannot help exploiting 
linguistic constraints of a language to which one is attuned. Hearing an utterance, one 
cannot help recognizing the sounds as a sentence with certain words, certain syntactic 
structure, and certain meaning (even if we may lack the information to determine what 
the speaker meant—she said and what she implicated). We cannot deliberately switch 
off our phonetic/syntactic/semantic device, so to speak, the way we can close our eyes. 
It is hard to free oneself and our fellow citizens from attunement to sexist 
constraints. They will disappear as we get dis-attuned to them. Slowly, but surely, some 
of them are disappearing. The challenge is to make them all disappear. 
4.4.3. Death  
Cultural constraints disappear when we cease to be attuned to them. Knowledge of the 
constraints may survive, as long as there is any human that (explicitly) knows them. 
And that can be a good thing—“Those who don’t know history are doomed to repeat 
it”—but it can be knowledge of a dead constraint.  
Consider the case of Latin. Many people were s-attuned, aw-attuned and fc-attuned 
to the set of constraints constituting the language. The constraints were made explicit in 
their grammar.  
But for various reasons the constraints evolved differently in different locations in 
the Roman Empire, and at some point nobody was attuned to Latin, but to different 
languages like Italian, French, Portuguese, Catalan or Spanish, with the attunement to 
Latin confined to monasteries and churches. The set of constraints of Latin was kept 
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explicitly represented in grammar books, so knowledge of them still survives, but as 
long as nobody is attuned to them, Latin is now a set of dead constraints.  
4.5. Conclusion 
As we have seen, the notion of constraints and our attunement to them is fundamental to 
the subject matter of culture. Current naturalistic approaches miss that point when they 
restrict their attention to information items or representations: 
“Talk of ‘culture’ (whatever the preferred definition or theory of culture) is about 
this widely distributed information and about its material realizations inside 
people’s minds and in their common environment (Sperber and Hirschfeld 2006: 
149) 
‘Culture’ refers to this widely distributed information, its representation in people’s 
minds, and its expressions in their behaviors and interactions. (Sperber and 
Hirschfeld 2004: 149) 
If I am right, constraints and attunement, which don’t correspond to information and our 
representation of it, need to enter into the picture of culture. Constraints are needed to 
have a naturalistic account of what information is. Attunement is needed to account for 
how we get information and how we eventually end with representations like 
knowledge and beliefs.  
There is a basic level of culture in which a set of people can be said to share a 
culture if they are distributively s-attuned to the same constraints. And that is something 
more common than it seems. This is how we can understand why a set of people behave 
in very similar ways with no informational packages represented and transmitted 
between them. 
  97 
I have explained the crucial difference between knowing and being attuned to 
constraints. An individual can be attuned to and not know (have represented) the 
constraints to which is attuned, and vice versa. The level of awareness of individuals 
regarding their attunement allows us to explain various aspects of culture: the difference 
between different cultural groups (with distributed s-attunement, common aw-
attunement and fully shared fc-attunement); the birth, evolution and death of cultural 
constraints. 
In the next chapter I will compare the constraint-based account of culture and IVC 
presented here, and go through the differences concerning some of the key defining 
properties of the cultural seen in Chapter 3. 
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5. Two alternative approaches? 
Differences and similarities on key notions  
5.1. Introduction 
The main thesis of the present work is that an adequate explanation of culture requires 
inclusion of constraints in the picture. I have elaborated a constraint-based approach that 
takes constraints as basic, in explicit contrast to the naturalistic views that I grouped 
together as the Itemic View (IVC). Now, one can ask whether I intend my approach to 
be an alternative to the IVC; whether I think that my approach should replace the IVC 
or not. In short: No. I think the constraint-based approach (CBA, for short) complements 
the IVC. It is a necessary complement, though. In this chapter I explain why. To do 
that, I’ll point to the main differences between the IVC and my approach.  
5.2. Constraints versus representations  
The first and most obvious contrast between CBA and IVC concerns their basic notions 
of an item (and, in particular, with the epidemiologist’s notion of representation) and 
my notion of a constraint. According to the itemic view, two people shaking hands, for 
instance, would constitute a greeting only insofar as the hand-shaking represents 
greeting, which would only be the case if the hand-shakers had a mental representation 
of the hand-shaking as greeting that would cause them to greet by hand-shaking in the 
future. The reproduction of the hand-shaking as the effect of those mental 
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representations would constitute a cultural chain which, in turn, would make this 
particular way of greeting, a cultural representation or a meme.51 That’s how I interpret 
Sperber’s insistence on the association between mental and public representations: (…) 
“public representations have meaning only through being associated with mental 
representations” (Sperber 1996: 80-81). 
To put it bluntly, I think that IVC puts the cart before the horse. Admittedly, a 
hand-shaking can publicly represent a greeting and can cause a mental representation of 
hand-shaking as greeting in people’s mind; but, to my mind, more than that or before 
that, conceptually speaking, a hand-shaking is a greeting, and not a representation 
(public or mental) of it. 
Remember the case of Yolanda when she was happily back in Albacete. As I see it, 
she and her fellow Albaceteans didn’t represent greeting by uttering “¡Buenos días!” to 
each other; they just greeted, being distributively s-attuned to the same conventional 
constraint. Given their s-attunement to the relevant constraints and their identification of 
the situation as belonging to a certain relevant type, they were able to behave 
accordingly, but this didn’t require the representation, public or mental, of the 
constraint. It was after arriving in the Basque Country, when things started not working 
as expected, that we can start talking about her representation of something or other; 
and, more precisely, when she got fc-attuned to the constraint, that we can start properly 
talking about her mental explicit representations about the constraints, the real situations 
she encountered and the situation types they may belong to. 
                                                
51 As I pointed out in Chapter 3, the notion of a meme is assimilable to Sperber’s notion of 
representation: “[t]he meme model might be seen as a limiting case of the influence model: the 
case where influence is·either 100 per cent or 0 per cent —that is, where descendants are 
replicas” (Sperber 1996: 105). 
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The standard evolutionary approach points to that when it acknowledges that 
cultural items are to some extent implicit or unconscious in us.52 For Boyd and 
Richerson culture is information which is not “always consciously available” (Boyd and 
Richerson 2005: 5).  
So we will use the term cultural variant. We will also sometimes use the ordinary 
English words idea, skill, belief, attitude, and value without meaning to imply that 
introspection is necessarily a reliable guide to what is stored in your own brain, or that 
what people tell you is necessarily a reliable guide to what is stored in their brains. 
(Boyd and Richerson 2005: 63) 
For Joseph Henrich cultural items in many cases go beyond the understanding of 
the individuals “using” them. As he says, “the bearers of these cultural adaptations 
themselves often don’t understand much of how or why they work, beyond the 
understanding necessary for effectively using them” (Henrich 2015: 27). 
In many cases, it just seems wrong-headed to talk about a cultural habit as a 
representation of anything: 
The evolutionary biologist and anatomist Dan Lieberman has studied long distance 
barefoot and minimally shod running in communities around the globe. When he asks 
runners of all ages how they learned to run, they never say they “just knew how.” 
Instead, they often name or point to an older, highly skilled, and more prestigious 
member of their group or community and say they just watch him and do what he 
does. [footnote 28: From conversations and correspondence with Dan Lieberman 
(2013–14)] (Henrich 2015:77)53 
                                                
52  See Bargh and Chartrand 1999 for empirical studies on the limitations of conscious 
intentional control in our everyday live behavior and choice making. 
53 Here running is linked to hunting. Heinrich describes how hunting requires a very specific 
way of running, which implies being attuned to the processes of the prey animal, so that by 
changes in intensity of running a hunter can beat an antelope through fatigue or heat 
exhaustion, and how this was possible thanks to our capacity to keep water in containers 
(outside of our bodies) and “water finding knowing-how cultural packages” (Henrich 2015: 
71-77). 
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To be sure, I must say Sperber sometimes waters the notion of representation down 
in such a way that we can take it to include something close to our notion of simple 
attunement to a constraint. At one point, he claims that 
This notion [of representation] does not presuppose that a representation must have 
internal structure, let alone language-like articulation. It does not impose any condition 
on the spatial and temporal location of representations, continuous or fragmented, 
inside or outside brains (other than what follows from the fact that representations are 
produced and used by cognitive devices and therefore must be within their reach—
they don’t just hover in social space). (Sperber 2006: 433) 
And, talking about cultural transmission, he makes room for information that is 
transmitted implicitly, and not properly communicated, not even implicitly: 
Some information, being of more general relevance, is repeatedly transmitted in an 
explicit or implicit manner and can end up being shared by many or even most 
members of the group. (Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004: 40) 
Public representations play a major role in information transmission. Much 
information, however, is communicated implicitly, that is, without being publicly 
represented. Information can also be transmitted without being properly speaking 
communicated, not even implicitly, as when one individual acquires a skill by 
observing and imitating the behavior of others. (Sperber and Hirschfeld 2006: 149) 
Their insistence on the notion of representation leaves unexplained, however, how 
implicit a representation can be and still count as a representation proper. I would put 
my approach this way: first we take implicit; then we take explicit. 
Think about Z-lang and its grammar. In my view, the grammar of a language is the 
constraints that link situations with sounds, with meanings. The attunement to those 
constraints and to constraints that involve those sounds-meanings with real 
communicative situations is what being able to speak a language amounts to. In favor of 
the IVC, you can insist that these rules are information represented in the mind/brain; 
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even if it is implicitly so. Now, insofar as the rules of a universal grammar are part of 
our biological endowment, that is not the kind of linguistic knowledge we are talking 
about when we talk about culture. It is the knowledge of a particular language that we 
take as cultural knowledge: words and their meanings are “cultural items par 
excellence” (Claidière et. al. 2014: 4). I would add that, initially at least, our linguistic 
abilities as speakers of a particular language don’t consist in the representation of some 
rules in the mind; we need not even represent ourselves as speaking a particular 
language. The representation of Z-lang as a particular language came with the encounter 
with foreign missionaries, and the explicit representation of the rules came even later. 
As Barwise and Perry aptly put it: 
COOKIE means cookie. (…) The word COOKIE is itself an uniformity across 
situations, a feature which is common to utterances containing the word. Similarly, the 
property of being a cookie is common to all situations in which a cookie is present. 
(…) And it is this systematic relation between uniformities, between the word 
COOKIE and the property of being a cookie, that the child must learn to exploit if she 
is to know the meaning of COOKIE, to come when mommy calls "cookie," and to 
demand "Cookie!" when she wants a cookie. (Barwise and Perry 1999 [1983]: 13) 
To know the meaning of a word, then, is to be attuned (s-attuned, we would say) to 
the relevant constraint (the relevant systematic relation) between situation types. And as 
they later add, this is not a matter of a conscious representation: 
Children use words to convey information about their wants and needs long before 
they are conscious of words as words. They can ask for a cookie by using the word 
COOKIE long before becoming consciously aware of the relation that makes this an 
effective strategy. But at a certain point they come to appreciate the relation and may 
even state “COOKIE means cookie.” To do so they must recognize meaning as a 
relationship between words and parts of their environment. (Barwise and Perry 1999 
[1983]: 18) 
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This constraint-based approach to the acquisition of word meaning is not 
incompatible with Sperber’s claim that imitation is neither the only mechanism of 
transmission nor the fundamental one, taking for granted that the actual process of 
word-sound-meaning acquisition is a complex one and that learning word-sounds can 
reasonably be described as a process of imitation. I agree that “describing the 
acquisition of the meaning of a word as a case of imitation makes little sense” because 
meanings “cannot be observed and imitated; they have to be inferentially 
reconstructed.” (Claidière et al. 2014: 4). If we can interpret the inferential 
reconstruction of the meaning of a word as the s-attunement to the constraint, then, 
there is no disagreement between the epidemiologists’ view and my constraint-based 
view. And I don’t see why we cannot interpret their claims that way: 
The child, for instance, might be able to infer on the basis of contextual evidence and 
expectations of relevance that the speaker who just said ‘what a nice dog!’ is referring 
to the terrier they are both looking at. Her task then is to generalize in just the right 
way the meaning of the word ‘dog’ to all and only dogs (i.e. not also to cats; and not 
only to terriers), that is, to reconstruct a meaning on the basis of limited evidence and 
of background knowledge. (Claidière et  al.2014: 4) 
If, on the other hand, we need to understand the inferential reconstruction of 
meaning as the re-construction of an explicit mental representation, then I disagree with 
epidemiologists (and memeticists). This difference would point then to another possible 
difference between my approach and IVC concerning the notion of transmission. 
The contrast between the notion of constraint, on the one hand, and the notion of 
item, on the other, has other consequences. One concerns the ways in which culture gets 
shared by a population: 
People learn as individuals. Therefore, if culture is learned, its ultimate locus must be 
in individuals rather than in groups … If we accept this, then cultural theory must 
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explain in what sense we can speak of culture as being shared or as the property of 
groups … and what the processes are by which such sharing arises. (Ward 
Goodenough 1981: 54) 
In explaining culture, then, three notions seem to come to the fore: the notion of a 
group, the notion of sharing, and the processes by which sharing culture by the 
individuals in a group arises. The CBA and IVC have different takes on those notions. I 
start with the latter. 
5.3. Transmission and attunement 
In general terms, the IVC takes transmission as a process for sharing the items that 
constitute a culture. It begins with a representation and ends in a representation. The 
transmission of culture then requires representations, and representations require 
transmission if they are to be shared in a population, and thus, become culture. Another 
way to put it is that culture is the product of “social learning”. This notion refers to an 
individual’s learning influenced by other individuals and the psychological processes 
involved: of which “cultural learning” would be a subclass in “which individuals seek to 
acquire information from others, often by making inferences about their preferences, 
goals, beliefs, or strategies and/or by copying their actions or motor patterns” (Heinrich 
2015: 12). 54  
The risk of circularity in the use of these notions seems evident: we shouldn’t take 
“cultural learning” as the transmission of cultural items (memes and representations) 
                                                
54 In this quote, and throughout the rest of the book, Heinrich does not explicitly address the 
point that this kind of information is constituted by representations. Although in other papers 
discussing the other IVC, Henrich and Boyd 2002, and Henrich et. al 2008 it is clear that they 
are talking of representations in Sperber’s terms. 
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while we take “cultural items” to be the items that are transmitted by cultural 
transmission.55 This is what the IVC seems to involve sometimes, as long as it 
conceives culture as “that” which is transmitted by non-genetic means within a 
population so that it is broadly distributed. Hence, items that are not transmitted are 
items that cannot be considered cultural.  
CBA, however, shows that this cannot be the whole story. Culture includes more 
than non-genetically transmitted items. But, as Morin observes, the IVC excludes that: 
Culture is made of ideas and practices that have reached a wide distribution in space or 
time (or both), and did so essentially for being transmitted (not for being frequently 
reinvented). This way of seeing is meant to break away from models where culture is 
nothing but a distribution, transmission being only a sideshow. It excludes “evoked” 
culture: widely distributed ideas and behaviors are not cultural if their spread owes 
little or nothing to transmission (in other words, if their distribution is not a diffusion) 
(Morin 2015: 36) 
Morin excludes, then, anything that is not distributed via transmission, even if it is 
distributed in a population by non-genetic means. We can say that the CBA’s main 
focus is precisely on accounting for those things, with constraints as its main theme: 
conventional constraints with distributed attunement to them. These constraints can be 
explicitly represented either mentally—after one realizes that something doesn’t work 
(Yolanda’s mornings) or by careful analysis (presumably by a social scientist)—or 
publicly—by communication or imitation (by explicitly “causing” the situations 
instantiating the constraint)—but they need not. As I’ve been trying to show, people can 
be s-attuned or aw-attuned to a constraint, without a representation, and then without 
                                                
55 These approaches appeal sometimes to social learning, which would include communication 
and imitation. “Imitation” is a term that encompasses mimicry (reproduction of behavior with 
no understanding of intentions or goal), emulation (the reproduction of the outcome of an 
action with no understanding of it as a goal), goal emulation or imitative learning (recognition 
of, and reproduction of the goal directed action). See Tomasello et. al. 1993, Tomasello and 
Carpenter 2005. 
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transmission being essentially involved. If we ignore this, we are leaving aside an 
important element of the subject matter of culture. 
Let’s talk about sexism again. It is beyond doubt that nowadays there are many 
representations (mental or public) with more or less explicit sexist and racial content 
that have been and are transmitted by communication and imitation, such that they are 
part of our cultural heritage. 
Just by checking on the web I found the following utterance: 
“They have the right to work wherever they want to… as long as they have dinner 
ready when you get home.” 
This is attributed to John Wayne, with his use of “they” referring to women. But I could 
have easily attributed it to my grandfather. And we can take it as an explicit cultural 
representation that was somehow transmitted to Wayne and he distributed it to many 
people either by communication (in utterances that roughly preserved a common 
content) or by imitation. The success in distribution of such a representation is naturally 
explained as belonging to a complex of representations with remote origins, some of 
them forcefully expressed in the Bible:  
Likewise, teach the older women to be reverent in the way they live, not to be 
slanderers or addicted to much wine, but to teach what is good. Then they can urge the 
younger women to love their husbands and children, to be self-controlled and pure, to 
be busy at home, to be kind, and to be subject to their husbands. (Titus 2:1-10) 
This text has been written and spoken out loud indefinitely many times in indefinitely 
many places for a very long time, and translated into many (maybe most) living and 
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dead languages.56 Its cultural status is clear. It propagates a very specific content of 
what is or should be a woman’s role. The fact that many people believe that 
prescriptions like that are right and that utterances like Wayne’s are true is certainly a 
cause of sexist behaviors. 
IVC is meant to capture this sort of cultural phenomenon. This is how the explicit 
prescription for women to have a “ready to eat dinner” for men has been made a cultural 
representation, public in many households and in public speeches around the world, and 
mental in many people’s mind/brains. Wayne’s utterance and the biblical passage 
constitute explicit cultural representations. Their distribution might have slowed down 
or stopped in some groups and societies, by the active denouncing of feminists; but not 
without opposition of people that still promote them, like Janusz Korwin-Mikke, an 
independent member of the European Parliament, who recently (March 1st, 2017) 
defended in a session of the Parliament that “women must earn less than men, because 
they are weaker, they are smaller, they are less intelligent.”57 
This statement has been reproduced in a memetic way through the media. It reached 
brains which did not have such representations, and in other cases the content of this 
representation matched with a preexisting belief in the host brain, which might trigger 
the production of a public representation expressing agreement with the content carried 
by this representation. Imagine a boy reproducing the utterance by mere imitation 
addressing his sister. This is the sort of picture that the IVC provides for the 
                                                
56 According to http://www.wycliffe.net/, the Bible has been translated partially into 2,587 
languages and completely into 636 languages. The mission of this website is to “encourage 
and facilitate Bible translation movements that contribute to the holistic transformation of 
language communities worldwide.” The group of people working on/for these projects would 
clearly count as a Christian religion memeplex replication “factory.” 
57 This is a good example of a memeplex, in which some ideas (“week,” “small,” “less 
intelligent”) come together to support one idea (women must earn less). They tend to appear 
together in every instance. 
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transmission of culture. The production of those public behaviors provides the input 
into the environment which allows imitation. Conceiving culture this way illustrates 
how such behaviors might trigger the mental representations of children, such that 
children too explicitly reproduce them by imitation in their games with toys. 
The IVC works to some extent, but I claim that we should acknowledge the 
important role of attunement to constraints, if we want to have a more complete view of 
cultural transmission and evolution, and in this case, the transmission and evolution of 
sexism as an example. 
To illustrate this, I’m going to use a personal example. I think I heard about 
Wayne’s utterance, or better said, the content of his utterance, in its Basque or perhaps 
Spanish version, long before I read it attributed to John Wayne. I knew it was a 
common belief in my grandparents’ time, and I may have heard a joke exploiting it. I 
possibly reproduced it linguistically sometimes.  
Except possibly from my grandparents, that wasn’t a belief held in my family. I’ve 
never heard my parents say anything like it, and they always reject this kind of 
representation. Nevertheless, after a memory exercise, I find that it was my mom who 
cooked most of the time, even if my dad is a good cook and he cooked on weekends and 
some other times. 
After I grew up, I heard utterances similar to John Wayne’s and thought about these 
issues, I came to I explicitly reject them. I’m quite certain that no one in my family has 
or will ever seriously utter such sentences and that no one holds that sort of belief. Yet 
my brothers and I realize that at our family reunions it is the case that women do the 
cooking. And while the men remain in their chairs chatting after the meal, the women 
clean up the table and do the dishes. So, whatever our attitudes towards explicit sexist 
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representations, there is some cultural constraint at work in our family, most likely, not 
only at family reunions: 
- Women are in charge of preparing meals, setting the table, cleaning it up and 
doing the dishes. Men, especially Josu and his brothers, may occasionally help 
in this or that. 
This constraint linking the family reunion situations with the various tasks to perform in 
those situations need not be represented in our minds. It is represented now in mine, 
when I’m explicitly thinking about it. But it was never transmitted via linguistic 
communication. Following the IVC, we can try to explain it as a case of imitation. The 
CBA explains it as a case of s-attunement to a conventional constraint, whose 
distribution makes it a cultural constraint. For years, we were not aware of its existence, 
because things seemed to work well more or less—though, who knows, the women in 
the family may think otherwise. Recently, my brothers and I became aw-attuned, that is 
to say, we became aware that we were attuned to some constraint that we didn’t know 
exactly how to make explicit. The point is that we may consciously reject a certain 
explicit representation of a constraint, transmit that rejection by communicating it, and 
still be attuned to it. We can, and we do, act against our principles, so to speak, and it’s 
not necessarily because we are hypocritical, but because we incur a sort of self-
deception: we believe one thing, we are attuned to the opposite. 
The CBA is meant to capture that. As the case of my family shows, the issue is not 
the holding of a belief as true (or a prescription as right) or not; it is not a matter of 
representations of this or that constraint. Admittedly, I would say that coming to realize 
that we are attuned to such constraints, and representing them, has been the reason why 
my brothers and I nowadays clean up (or we try to clean up) the table at our family 
events. 
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In this picture, constraints are neither representations nor information; they are 
relations between situations in the world. Although they can be represented in people’s 
minds they do not have to be. That is, constraints are not items that are transmitted; and, 
therefore, the subject matter of culture, as long as it is constituted by constraints, is not 
distributed by transmission, but by attunement. The IVC does not admit this: “Does a 
tradition’s transmission necessarily imply an exchange of representations? Yes” (Morin 
2015: 48).58 To the extent that it sticks to items (representations) and their transmission, 
the IVC is missing an important part of culture. That is one of my most important 
claims.59 
5.4. The notion of sharing  
As I have repeatedly said, in general terms “culture” amounts to what is shared by 
individuals of a group. In this sense, “being shared” seems to be a key feature of the 
subject matter of culture. This raises the question of how culture gets to be shared 
among individuals. And, for the IVC, the idea of culture being shared is directly related 
with the transmission of culture. I have argued that constraints are part of the subject 
matter of culture and that they are not transmitted. But the fact that constraints are not 
transmitted does not imply that they are not shared. Both the IVC and the CBA 
                                                
58 Morin defines culture as traditions: “culture is everything that is traditional, in other words, 
everything that transmission propagates across large scales of space and time.” Morin (2015: 
216) 
59 Perhaps, someone might rejoin that the IVC-notion of “representation” might include implicit, 
unconscious, sub-personal… representations, so that our differences would be more apparent 
than substantial. If so, it wouldn’t be clear what their notion of transmission would amount to. 
It could be similar to attunement, and then, our differences could be just a matter of emphasis, 
as I discussed in Chapter 4, though I suspect they are not. 
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acknowledge that “being shared” is key to the subject matter of culture. But their 
notions are different. For the former it is directly related to transmission; for the latter it 
is directly related to attunement.  
Before explaining the differences between the CBA and the IVC on the notion of 
“sharing” culture, let’s sketch four ways to think about this notion.  
The first one is about how we think about sharing physical objects. When we say 
that a cake is shared between four people what we mean is that each one has a piece of 
cake (ideally equally proportional). That is, the object shared has been split into pieces 
so that if we could gather together again all the pieces, we will have the complete shared 
object, in this case, the cake. In other words, we say that the four friends shared the cake 
because each one has a piece that belongs to the same object.  
Nevertheless, it is obvious that there are things that we share without breaking them 
into pieces, such as a flat or the painting Guernica. This is a second way to think about 
sharing physical objects. In these cases, what we mean by “sharing” is that more than 
one individual uses or enjoys the same object.  
A third way to think about sharing has to do with things like ideas, beliefs, and 
intentions. When I say that an idea is shared, I mean that each individual has an instance 
of the idea in their minds/brains because the idea has been copied or re-produced. That 
is to say, if two individuals share an idea, there are two instances of the idea in the 
world. In contrast, when four individuals share a cake, they do not end up with four 
cakes. While in the case of physical objects the amount of entities remains the same 
while sharing them, in the case of ideas, the amount of entities increase, that is, there are 
more tokens of the same type (an idea in this case). In other words, when individuals 
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share an idea is because they “have” in their brains “something” with the same (or 
minimally resembling) representational or propositional content. 
The fourth and last way to think about sharing has to do with different objects 
having some properties in common. Being blue is a property that my cup and my pen 
share, but they do not share it because the property is divided between my pen and my 
cup, nor because either of them has copied (re-produced) it, as in the case of ideas. 
The IVC notion of sharing is that of the second kind of those sketched out above. 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, culture for the IVC is a matter of items transmitted 
within a group, so that they get widely distributed within it. It is the fact that some items 
preserve their informational content that makes them cultural. This means that in the 
brains, and in the environment of the individuals of the group, there are instances of a 
given item with a minimally resembling content between them, and this is what it 
means for individuals to share a cultural item. Think about the story of Little Red Riding 
Hood (LRRH for short). If we have one individual with a mental representation of 
LRRH who tells the story to another individual, in whom a mental representation of 
LRRH is caused, we can say that they share the story of LRRH. There are now two 
mental representations in the world which have a minimally resembling content, and 
this is what the IVC takes to be the case when individuals share the same cultural 
item.60 
In a nutshell, for the IVC a cultural item is shared because of the way in which it is 
transmitted. Individuals share an item like LRRH because they are part of a chain in the 
                                                
60 One might be tempted to say that the Guernica mentioned above would not be, according to 
this, a cultural item, but just remember that when several individuals see the painting, a mental 
representation (a mental image) of the painting is created in their brains and that there are 
several reproductions of the painting in pictures all around the world, all of which preserve (or 
resemble) the content of the Guernica. 
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transmission of the story: they heard it, a mental representation is produced in their 
brains and they reproduce it getting to share the cultural item with other individuals.  
In contrast with this, CBA would adopt something like our fourth way of thinking 
about sharing. Constraints are systematic relations in the world (natural or 
conventional), and, thus, they are not “things” that we share because they are re-
produced or divided up. Instead, they are shared because at least two individuals are 
attuned to them. There are not two constraints when individuals get attuned; there is 
only one. Constraints are not things in people’s brains and this is why they cannot be 
shared as if they were items. Do not confuse the fact that we can represent constraints 
and share those representations when sharing the constraint. Think about Yolanda’s 
Basque friends. They all share the constraint that, when someone greets them, they 
slightly move their heads to return the greeting. When this happens, there is not a 
constraint for each person greeting like that, there are three individuals attuned to the 
same constraint.  
One might think that, concerning culture, the IVC would argue that its notion of 
sharing matches with the third way I have described. So that it would not be so different 
from sharing constraints. This is because, despite having many representations, they are 
of a cultural item. LRRH is one such cultural item which has millions of instances. The 
difference is clear, however: sharing a cultural item implies a proliferation of items 
(representations, memes…). That is, there has to be new instances of the cultural item in 
people’s brains and in their environment. Sharing a constraint requires nothing like that.  
Thus, the CBA notion of sharing is different because it does not involve the 
transmission of constraints or the multiplication of items. Individuals do not need to be 
related by a chain of transmission. Think about the following constraint. For some 
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people, situations in which there are police present, involves situations in which they are 
in trouble. There are groups of people in the world that are attuned to this constraint, not 
necessarily because the constraint has been transmitted to them, but because they live in 
environments where this constraint holds. Ask African-Americans in the United States, 
gypsies anywhere, or Basque youth. The key difference, then, is that a constraint can be 
shared by individuals coming to be attuned to it independently, or, in my terminology, 
with distributed s-attunement. 
5.5. The notion of group 
Culture is closely linked to populations of people, and as such talking about culture has 
involved talking about groups. The IVC does not address this issue directly, but 
according to what I have argued so far, CBA and the IVC would also have some 
differences depending on the relevant notion of group. 
For an account that bases the subject matter of culture on items, cultural groups 
would be defined by the items (representations) that are in the brains and environment 
of individuals of a population:  
A group can be characterized by the number of individuals who exhibit each 
different cultural variant. We refer to this as the “distribution of cultural variants” (or 
phenotypes) within the group. (Boyd and Richerson 1988 [1985]: 23) 
Then, as we have seen with sexism, for the IVC only the individuals who have 
sexist cultural representations in mind and have sexist behaviors caused by such 
representations would constitute the relevant (sexist) cultural group, and the ones who 
  115 
do not, would not be members of it. Thus, for the IVC, cultural groups vary with 
relation to cultural items.  
If we think about culture in terms of constraints, taking conventional constraints 
and the attunement to them as being key to the subject matter of culture, then cultural 
groups are defined by the individuals that are attuned to the conventional constraints.  
In the case of sexism, then, we do not need people to have sexist beliefs in order to 
form a sexist cultural group. It would be the people attuned to sexist constraints who 
would count. In other words, even if no one had sexist representations, but behaved in a 
sexist manner due to their attunement, then they would constitute a cultural group.61 
This allows us to capture cases in which beliefs, knowledge, ideals and behavior 
mismatch: people with no racist beliefs show racist behaviors, due to their attunement to 
a constraint which leads them to such behaviors, and the opposite: people with racist 
beliefs act as if they did not.62  
The difference between IVC and CBA is then that we get different cultural groups 
from the same population: one, which is defined by representations and the other which 
is defined by attunement. For the CBA, the classification of cultural groups regarding 
sports teams, religious groups or political ideologies might differ from the ones that the 
IVC would make. 
As I said earlier, the IVC does not directly address the notion of group, but as it is, 
one can detect a sort of vicious circularity in their general view of culture. In their view, 
a representation is cultural if it is sufficiently distributed in a group. And a group is 
                                                
61 In the following lines, I will make a distinction between cultural sets and groups. 
62 This is an oversimplification since there are also other reasons that explain those mismatches. 
But the idea here is to show that attunement can be one of the reasons (amongst others) why it 
happens. 
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cultural if their members share a representation. But what is a group? Does the notion of 
group involve something else other than the individuals who form it? Or does it already 
require their members to share some representation? Maybe not just any representation, 
but a representation of themselves as forming a group? It is not clear how the IVC 
would answer these questions, but there is no such problem for the CBA. 
First of all, I prefer to talk about sets and not groups of people. In a set, there is 
nothing over and above the individuals that are its members. The members of the set of 
humans do not have to share any other property than just being human. Subsets (except 
the empty set and singletons) of humans can be distinguished as cultural sets if and only 
if their members are s-attuned to the same conventional constraint. If the conventional 
constraint gets s-attuned by more than one individual, then we have not only a cultural 
set, but also a cultural constraint. In this sense, a gypsy, a Basque youth and an African-
American can be taken to belong to the same cultural set as long as they are s-attuned to 
the same (cultural) constraint linking police and trouble without having any relation 
with regards to a chain of representation sharing, in the sense established by the IVC. 
I distinguish this notion of a cultural set and the notion of a cultural group. And 
among the latter, I will distinguish between aw-groups and c-groups, following from my 
previous distinction between aw-attunement and fc-attunement. The difference between 
a mere cultural set and a cultural aw-group is just the difference in attunement to the 
constraint in question. One thing is to be s-attuned to a constraint, that is, without being 
aware that you are attuned to it and that some other individual is similarly attuned to it, 
and a quite different thing is to be aware that you share the attunement to the same 
thing, even if you cannot tell exactly to what. I suggest that something like that is 
present when two people belonging to some minority meet. There is a sense of 
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belonging together, of sharing something that is not easy to identify. Like the sense of 
belonging to a group who are most likely to be considered suspects by the officers at an 
airport security control position. You can be aware that you and some other people are 
the usual victims of some cultural constraint held by those officers, even if you don’t 
know exactly what it is. 
This still wouldn’t be a case of what I call a culturally conscious group or c-group. I 
call a “cultural c-group” the groups whose members are fc-attuned to the same 
constraint. This is the sense in which a cultural group can be taken to form what Gilbert 
calls a plural subject (Gilbert 1989, 2006) and others call a collective agent or a we-
agent (Bratman 1999 [1997], Korta 2004, Searle 1990, Tuomela and Miller 1988). The 
members not only share an explicit representation—a belief, a goal, an intention, or an 
itemized constraint—but they also share a representation of them as a collective or we-
agent. 
The CBA, then, gives us the tools to distinguish between the different senses of 
“group” that can be relevant to the explanation of culture; from mere cultural groups to 
fully conscious cultural groups, through self-aware cultural groups with varying degrees 
of explicitness about what they share and who they are as a group. And distinguishing 
among them is helpful for the social sciences:  
Determining that a particular population is not a social group in a given sense is (of 
course) in no way to argue that it is not of great importance from a number of points of 
view. It is likely often to be helpful, meanwhile, to distinguish plural subjects from 
other populations, insofar as different things can be said about these different kinds of 
populations and their members. Insofar as economic classes, say, are not plural subjects, 
it is important to recognize that fact.[footnote 2: Recall Marx’s famous distinction 
  118 
between Klasse an Sich and Klasse für Sich (classes in themselves and classes for 
themselves), the latter alone involving some form of self-awareness. See e.g. Marx and 
Engels (1977: 214).]” (Gilbert 2006: 166-167) 
Paraphrasing Gilbert, it is important to distinguish cultural groups in themselves 
(cultural sets) and cultural groups for themselves (cultural aw- and c-groups). 
5.6. Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I have compared the IVC and the CBA with respect to some 
basic notions: 1) The IVC notion of item versus the CBA notion of constraint; 2) the 
ways in which culture gets non-genetically shared and 3) the notion of sharing itself 
and, finally, 4) the notion of cultural group.  
I conclude that these differences show that the IVC and CBA are not incompatible 
conceptions. I rather think that they are compatible and, in fact, that the CBA offers the 
conceptual grounds that the IVC requires. The IVC notion of item requires the notion of 
constraint, which is conceptually primary. The IVC notion of transmission is just a 
special case of the ways in which we get to share culture, which I explain, in its most 
basic form, as distributed attunement to conventional constraints. And, similarly, for the 
notion of sharing and the notion(s) of group, the CBA seems to offer the appropriate 
foundations for the notions demanded by the IVC. 
  119 
  
  120 
6. Conclusions 
6.1. Introduction  
I have shown that the fact that current naturalistic approaches ⎯the Epidemiological, 
Memetics and the Standard Evolutionary approach⎯ reduce culture to items, leads 
them to miss a key element in the subject matter of culture: an element that is best 
captured by the notion of constraints. Those three approaches represent what I call the 
Itemic View of Culture (IVC), that is to say, the view that assumes that culture is a 
collection of items in people’s brains and environments, that they share by social 
transmission among the individuals of a population through time. 
The IVC acknowledges that there is a non-conscious or implicit component in 
culture, an issue which is mentioned but which they don’t provide an account for. While 
acknowledging these implicit features, their explanations are exclusively focused on 
explicitly representational items such as belief, ideas, tales, gestures and so on and so 
forth.63 
The CBA addresses the issue by elaborating the concept of cultural constraints and 
the role that different modes of attunement play with respect to those constraints. We 
have distinguished three different ways of being attuned to constraints: simple, aware- 
and fully conscious. They differ in the degree of awareness of the attunement by 
individuals, and the availability of and explicit representation of the constraint. The 
                                                
63 The examples of implicit elements that they discuss are related to the ways of doing things 
that people have, but do not explicitly know how they do those things. See Henrich’s (2015: 
77) quote in Chapter 5. 
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various modes of attunement explain the crucial differences between explicit and 
implicit knowledge that the IVC assumes. The CBA accounts for the birth, evolution 
and death of cultural constraints, from fundamentally implicit to possibly explicit 
cultural information and knowledge. Moreover, the CBA avoids the risk of a vicious 
circle in the definition of culture and cultural groups, distinguishing mere sums, 
aggregates and collections of individuals from institutionalized cultural groups self-
identified as such, and all the kinds of cultural groups in between.  
The first intuition that led me to think that something like the CBA was needed was 
the realization that the IVC identifies cultural items by their informational content, 
without providing any theory of information.64 A theory of information was needed and 
Situation Theory (Israel and Perry 1990, 1991) provides it. Situations contain and carry 
information due to the constraints relating them, and the flow of information requires 
attunement to constraints by organisms.65 
With this as a starting point, a closer look at culture shows that the introduction of 
constraints as the subject matter of culture, involves a different conception of what 
culture is. The main difference between IVC and CBA is that the latter does not require 
representation-like items for exploiting and sharing information. 
My point should be clear by now: it is a mistake to conceive of culture as merely 
the collection of shared items in individuals’ brains and their environment. At its most 
fundamental level, culture is unrepresented, simple attunement to a conventional 
                                                
64 Which they do not seem to be working to provide, as Lewens says “at this point one might 
think it useful to look to philosophical theories to tell cultural evolutionists what they ought to 
mean by the notion of ‘cultural information’.” See Lewens 2015 Chapter 3, where he argues 
for a “don’t ask/don’t tell” standpoint. See footnote 36 in Chapter 3 of the present dissertation. 
65 See Dretske 1981, Devlin 1991, Perry 1993 [1990]. 
  122 
constraint. Everything else cultural, and especially representational cultural items, 
comes later, ontologically and conceptually speaking.  
Nevertheless, although the CBA emphasizes the insufficiencies of the IVC, I think 
that they are mutually complementary. The CBA can count on the IVC to deal with 
cultural items and our explicit knowledge of them. But the CBA grounds the subject 
matter of culture, and gives us appropriate tools to tackle the aspects that the IVC 
throws into its implicit dustbin. 
6.2. Cultural conflict 
A conclusion that derives from the CBA is that, since situations carry information in 
virtue of the constraints to which individuals are attuned, then, the same situation can 
carry different information by the attunement of individuals to different constraints. 
Those are the occasions that may lead to misunderstandings and cultural conflicts 
Let’s imagine the following. Ahmed is a friend from ILCLI’s Master Program. He 
is from Morocco and invited me to the marriage of his sister in Morocco. When we 
arrived I saw that everybody was dressed elegantly and seemed happy and excited by 
the event. 
The sister of Ahmed, Nisrin, was marrying a man from a traditional family. I was 
surprised at how different the marriage rituals are in Morocco. Suddenly, after the 
marriage ceremony and after all family and friends gave their best wishes to the couple, 
Ahmed told me that he wanted to introduce me to his sister. 
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I wanted to congratulate her and transmit my good wishes to the couple. The sister 
and her husband were together when we approached. Ahmed told his sister that I am a 
colleague from his program of study in Donostia. I suppose that’s what he said, because 
all I understood was “master” and ‘Donostia’, the rest was in Arabic except ‘Josu.’ Just 
after that, Ahmed said to me in English “This is my sister, Nisrin,” I approached her 
with the aim of greeting her by giving her a kiss on each cheek; she stepped back and 
extended her hand to greet me, and at the same time, her husband shouldered his way in 
between to stop me. 
After this I was paralyzed like a stone and realized that I had done something 
wrong. Many people were looking at us, especially me, with a furrowed brow that 
usually does not mean anything good anywhere (I believe). The husband shouted at me 
in Arabic and Ahmed asked me to move away while at the same time talking to the 
husband.  
The fact that I am a foreigner, that Ahmed’s close family is not strongly traditional, 
and that I am a “guest and friend of the brother of the wife” lessened the trouble, and I 
was not kicked out of the ceremony, and the trouble did not last much longer. However, 
they remarked that this situation was inconceivable to them “No Moroccan guy would 
do that ever! It is like a taboo.” 
But what was going on there from a CBA perspective? In a nutshell, the same 
situation carried not just different, but conflicting information for the people in it, 
because they were attuned to different constraints. I was attuned to a set of constraints 
(if someone introduces you to a woman then you kiss both cheeks to greet her in order 
to be polite), and the rest of the people there were attuned to a different set of contraints 
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(it is disrespectful to the woman, and both families, for a man, who is not from the 
family to kiss or touch the fiancé at a wedding). 
Given that I am at a wedding, that Ahmed presented Nisrin to me, and I am a man 
and Nisrin is a woman, I got the information that I had to kiss both cheeks of Nisrin. 
And so I expected the following flow of information: 
IE: The fact that Josu kissed Nisrin’s cheeks carries the information that Josu is 
being polite to Nisrin and Ahmed.  
This would be the information any individual of my culture would get. But this was 
not the case for the other people at the wedding, except for Ahmed, who knows how 
men greet unknown women when first introduced in the Basque Country. 
The perspective for Nisrin, her husband and most people at the wedding goes 
differently. The information that they got was: 
IAS: The fact that Josu attempted to kiss both cheeks of Nisrin carries the 
information that Josu is being disrespectful to Nisrin and her family. 
The point of this example is to illustrate a case in which the information available 
to individuals differs due to their attunement to different constraints; where the situation 
is the same for all individuals. The constraints to which they are attuned cause them to 
get different information, which drives how they act.  
This is why I conclude that culture is more than just information shared or 
transmitted repeatedly. Culture is the set of constraints to which individuals are attuned 
to (s-, aw-, or fc-) that makes available certain information to individuals or “makes” 
them behave in specific ways. 
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As species we evolve in a particular setting, one in which certain conditions were, 
by and large, fulfilled. As long as we stay in a setting where these conditions are 
satisfied, the constraints to which we are attuned can be exploited to get 
information about one situation from another. However as we stray from that 
setting, or if the setting is radically changed, we may mistakenly rely on these 
constraints in situations where the requisite conditions are not met, thus in 
situations where the constraints may no longer hold. (Barwise and Perry 1999 
[1983]: 99). 
6.3. Further research 
The CBA needs to be developed beyond the limits of this dissertation,. Some possible 
lines of investigation are: 
1) Which role do constraints play in the recognition of an artwork, as an artwork, 
and not a mere artifact? 
2) What are the cultural constraints in art appreciation? 
3) Are there universal cultural constraints? 
4) Are techniques cultural constraints or are they cultural items? Or are they just 
entangled natural constraints wearing a cultural costume? 
5) What is the origin of the cultural constraints that make fiction such a central 
component of culture?  
However, I know my limits, and so I will look in brief at some questions about 
which I have a clearer idea. 
6.3.1. Cultural transmission and theories of communication 
Communication is one of the main mechanisms of transmission of the informational 
content of many cultural items such as ideas, beliefs, encyclopedic knowledge and so 
on. This suggests the following question: What difference does it make to our account 
of culture, which theory of communication you adopt? 
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This was somehow implicit in Sperber’s (1996) book, where he says that in 
developing Relevance Theory (1986/1995) with Deirdre Wilson, he took that theory as 
a “theory of human communication and as a general approach to many issues in 
cognition. My initial interest in our collaborative project had to do with the role 
communication plays in culture.” (Sperber 1996: vii).  
However, developing his Epidemiological approach, he does little more than 
suggest that transmission by communication would tend to preserve his relevance 
principle of “effect-effort ratio,” which should show then that cultural representations 
that are transmitted by communication are the ones “selected” by this principle: 
[In] the process of transmission, representations are transformed. This occurs not in 
a random fashion, but in the direction of contents that require lesser mental effort 
and provide greater cognitive effects. This tendency to optimize the effect-effort 
ratio—and therefore the relevance of the representations transmitted (see Sperber 
and Wilson 1986/1995)—drives the progressive transformation of representations 
within a given society towards contents that are relevant in the context of one 
another (Sperber 1996: 52-53) 
As Relevance Theory goes, one might expect that he is thinking of the hearer’s side of 
the cultural transmission chain we looked at in chapter 3, but he actually has the 
producer’s side in mind:  
It is plausible that individuals should be equipped so as to tend to optimize the 
effect-effort balance not just on the input side, but also on the output side. Public 
productions, from bodily movements, to speech, to buildings, even when they are 
modelled on some previous productions, are likely to move towards forms where 
the intended effect can be achieved at minimal cost. (Sperber 1996: 114) 
Even though, he extends here the scope of Relevance Theory to “public production” 
which go beyond language and includes behaviors and artifacts, Sperber did not develop 
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that “initial interest” in depth. This is why I think that an interesting line of research 
would be the following: 
The CBA of culture is rooted in Situation Theory, and one development of it 
towards a pragmatic theory of communication was Critical Pragmatics (Korta and 
Perry 2011). The point is to see if Critical Pragmatics offers a better theory of 
communication as cultural transmission. I think that the content-pluralism of Critical 
Pragmatics and the notion of unarticulated constituents can be a key to understanding 
the importance of constraints in explaining the role of implicit information in 
communication and what is stable vs. what is variable in chains and networks of 
utterances. 
6.3.2. Social ontology in culture 
If Searle is right and “[w]e are confronted with a social and institutional reality that is 
for us objective, yet exists only because people believe it exists” (Searle 2007: 11), one 
of the issues I would like to address is the issue of cultural identity. If the CBA is right, 
how do I build my cultural identity, given that I am a member of so many cultural 
groups many of which I am aware of, but also many of which I am not aware of? Does 
my cultural identity involve a multiple identity?  
The CBA, and more precisely the fact that we are s-attuned, aw-attuned and fc-
attuned to cultural constraints, might provide some insights into the topic of the social 
ontology of collective agents, actions and intentions (Bratman 1999, Epstein 2015, 
Gilbert 1989). 
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6.3.3. Social epistemology 
On the other hand, it would be interesting to look into the links between IVC, especially 
the epidemiological approach, and the role truth might have in it, both as a property that 
may influence their transmission and endurance, and also in relation to the study of the 
mechanisms of cultural transmission as devices of knowledge transmission. Current 
social epistemology (along the lines of, for instance, Goldman 1999) might be fruitful in 
the study of the effect that the “veritistic value” of a cultural representation might have 
on its propagation.  
It would also be interesting to research what effect CBA would have on the issue of 
the uniformity (diversity) of culture(s). This analysis would constitute a test to discover 
if social epistemology is mainly itemic, and if so it would be interesting to investigate 
what would be a CBA of social epistemology taking into account the distribution of 
attunement, and the role representation plays in that distribution it.  
 
Fortunately, the future is open and, whatever happens, paraphrasing the poem that 
opens this thesis, repeating what our elders said is a way of keeping their words alive. 
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